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1. Introduction 
 
I would suggest that you better choose another topic.  
Li Narangoa, 2013 
 
The purpose of this paper is to discuss Manchus especially in the context of 
Manchukuo. Manchukuo was a state that existed from 1932 to 1945 and encompassed 
the eastern parts of Inner Mongolia and the provinces of Heilongjiang, Jilin and 
Liaoning in today’s People’s Republic of China (PRC). While Manchukuo defines this 
political realm, the term Manchuria has been used from the 17th century onwards to 
describe the geographical area in question. Manchuria can be roughly defined as the 
area between Korea, China proper, Mongolia and Siberia1. Today, Chinese favour the 
term Dongsansheng (东三省，Three Eastern Provinces) or Dongbei (东北，Northeast) 
instead of Manchuria, but the term Manchuria is still widely used in Western research. 
Manchukuo (also rendered Manchoukuo or Manzhouguo) was founded with the strong 
involvement of the Japanese; therefore it is often designated as the ”Puppet state of 
Japan” (in Chinese Weimanguo 伪满国, ”fake Manchu land”). Manchus originated 
from Southern Manchuria and were the ruling class of the Qing Dynasty (1644-1912). 
Today, Manchus are the third largest ethnic group in the People’s Republic of China 
with a population of about 10,3 million. However, Manchus after the Qing Dynasty and 
especially during the Manchukuo period have been researched little. This Master’s 
Thesis aims to explore this topic that rightly deserves more attention.  
 
During the research period I had the chance to work in the premises of Nordic Institute 
of Asian Studies (NIAS) in Copenhagen. Defining an exact research question was 
extremely challenging – how to research a matter that is merely mentioned fleetingly 
here and there? Researching Manchus in Manchukuo is equal to chasing ghosts, things 
to whose existence many do not even believe in. Manchus were certainly not the most 
visible group of people in Manchukuo, or as reverend and missionary John Stewart 
pointed out in 1944; “…the population, which the Government claims to be about forty 
million, is still overwhelmingly Chinese. Manchus are rather scarce; they are not very 
 
1 Janhunen, 1996, p. 3. 
 4  
easy to find when one wants them”2. Han Chinese did constitute the majority of the 
population in Manchukuo, but Manchus were certainly not extinct. Nevertheless, 
whereas Japanese 3 , Mongols 4 , Han Chinese 5  and to some extent Koreans 6  in 
Manchukuo have gathered academical interest, especially non-elite Manchus have, to a 
large extent, sunk into the depths of history. They did not leave many literary sources 
behind, and most of all, today they do not have their own nation state to conduct 
historical research from their point of view. During my time in Copenhagen, I had the 
honor to be in contact with a renowned researcher on Manchukuo, Li Narangoa, about 
the loss of viewpoint in my research. Her advice was blunt and certainly the answer of 
an experienced Manchukuo researcher: “I would suggest that you better choose another 
topic.”  
 
However, I did not yield that easily. Manchukuo is an intriguing and complex topic of 
study. I became fascinated with it already in my Bachelor’s Thesis, which discussed the 
diplomatic relationship between Finland and Manchukuo; during the Second World War 
(WWII) Finland was allied with Germany and Japan, a situation that made it quite 
necessary for Finland to recognize Manchukuo and tie diplomatic relations with it. 
Other justifications included the potential economical benefits and the belief that Finns 
and Manchus were kindred peoples united by distant ancestors. However, in practice 
diplomatic relations between Finland and Manchukuo amounted to nil due to precarious 
conditions during WWII.7 The Professor of East-Asian Studies in the University of 
Helsinki, Juha Janhunen, further suggested that I focus on Manchus in Manchukuo.  
 
In the end, the problem of the research question was solved by engineering a bipartite 
nature for the thesis. The first aim is to reason why the original hypothesis was wrong. 
The original hypothesis stated that Manchus in Manchukuo enjoyed a privileged status. 
After all, post-Qing Manchuria under the leadership of Zhang Zuolin and his son Zhang 
Xueliang enjoyed a relative stability that was unknown in the chaotic China Proper. It 
 
2 Stewart, 1944, p. 68. 
3 see e.g. numerous publications from Mariko Asano Tamanoi. 
4 see e.g. numerous publications from Owen Lattimore, Nakami Tatsuo, “Mongol nationalism and 
Japan”, 2003. 
5 see e.g. Thomas Gottschang & Diana Lary, Swallows and settlers: the great migration from North 
China to Manchuria, 2000.  
6 see e.g. Suk-Jung Han, “From Pusan to Fengtian: the borderline between Korea and Manchukuo in 
the 1930’s”, 2005. 
7 Mursu, 2011.  
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was in the interest of many local factions to preserve this situation by maintaining 
Manchuria’s separateness from the China Proper. For example Mongols saw great 
promise in Manchukuo. 8  Furthermore, Manchukuo bore the name of Manchus, the 
nominal head of the state was a Manchu, and Manchus had great importance in 
Manchukuo’s state ideologies. To certain extent the original hypothesis is quite true – 
the conditions of Manchus in China Proper were quite undignified during the time of the 
Republic of China in comparison to Manchus in Manchukuo. However, after collecting 
data on the matter, it seems that majority of Manchus in Manchukuo were 
impoverished, unemployed or poorly paid if employed, and had only limited access to 
education especially in Manchu language. Furthermore, the Government of Manchukuo 
is known to have had only one Manchu minister during its existence. Summa 
summarum, there seems to be no evidence of unified Manchu alliance that stood behind 
Manchukuo. It rather appears that Manchukuo was mainly a project engineered by the 
Japanese who wanted a base from which to attack China Proper, local Manchurian 
power holders (most of whom where Han Chinese) who wanted to develop Manchuria 
as an individual entity, and Qing-loyalists (some of whom where Manchus) who wanted 
to redeem the Qing Dynasty through Manchukuo – three very contradictory agendas of 
which the first mentioned prevailed.  
 
Secondly, this master’s thesis attends to the question of why Manchus, especially after 
the Qing Dynasty, are considered such a problematic topic of study. There are many 
quite obvious practical, political and ideological reasons that have withheld researchers 
from taking this topic under inspection. In this study, however, it is suggested that there 
exists one even more elementary reason for the problematic nature of Manchu studies – 
the conceptual problem of Manchus. Various concepts have been used to describe 
Manchus, such as an ethnic group, ethnicity, race, nationality, minority and so on, but 
these concepts are oftentimes vague and too inexact. As Pamela Kyle Crossley pointed 
out in her article Thinking about ethnicity in early modern China (1990), the concept of 
ethnicity is in its elasticity both welcome and regretted; however, it is usually implicitly 
assumed that ethnicity has existed in a form or another in a significant manner in 
China.9 Crossley’s view is that Manchus were not an ethnicity in the beginning, but later 
 
8 Jones, 1949, p. 8-9, 55-81. 
9 Crossley, 1990a, p. 1-2. 
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were10. S. M. Shirokogoroff, on the other hand, maintained that Manchus were an 
indigenous ethnicity in some places, while in some places they ceased to be so 11 . 
Defining Manchus is one of the major challenges in research on Manchu history. 
Likewise this Master’s Thesis endeavours to analyze the conceptual problem that 
surrounds Manchus and bring forward criticism on notions that are oftentimes taken for 
granted. 
 
Earlier research: Manchukuo. In Western English research Manchukuo has, for a 
long time, been mainly and merely regarded as a subtopic in Japan and China’s 
relationship, or a phase in Japan’s expansion politics before and during WWII. 
Manchukuo has been nominated a puppet state and, it seems, therefore disregarded as a 
worthwile area of study.12 As Suk Jung-Han conveyed it, “When scholars persist in 
seeing this entity as simply a puppet, the multifaceted character of its fourteen-year 
history is obscured and Manchukuo’s potential as a model remains submerged.” 13 
However, the situation has improved during the last decade as more critical attention 
has been concentrated on Manchukuo as an individual entity. One of the most important 
works on this area is Duara Prasenjit’s Sovereignty and authenticity (2004) that in step 
with Suk-Jung Han’s statement challenges the concept of Manchukuo merely as a 
puppet state, and emphasizes it as an exemplary of state construction14. Unfortunately, 
majority of research published on Manchukuo during the last decade persists on 
concentrating on questions of foreign policy. Still very little is known about the actual 
domestic situation of Manchukuo. Some exceptions to this rule, however, have 
emerged, for example Norman Smith’s Intoxicating Manchuria: alcohol, opium, and 
culture in China’s Northeast (2013).  
 
In this paper, Chinese research on Manchukuo has been mainly disregarded. Firstly, the 
vast amount of sources must be narrowed down one way or another. Secondly, the 
majority of Chinese research on Manchukuo is poor in actual information, very 
emotionally charged, and of appalling quality when it comes to basic requirements of 
research. Hardly any Chinese scholar has tried to invent an innovative point of view on 
 
10 Crossley, 1990a & 1997. 
11 Shirokogoroff, 1924. 
12 Shao, 2011, p. 6. 
13 Han, 2004, p. 457. 
14 Duara, 2004. 
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the topic, a fact that many researchers on Manchukuo have pointed out. Instead, the 
same story of the evil history of Weimanguo is repeated with very similar phrases. The 
very same sentences also recur on the information boards in the monuments that have 
been commemorated for the cause, for example the 18th of September History Museum 
in Shenyang, the Puppet Emperor’s Palace in Changchun and the Unit 731 Museum 
near Harbin. As the purpose of this study is not to research the rhetorics of propaganda, 
certain distance must be kept to all Chinese research. The aim is not to belittle the 
atrocities Japanese committed during WWII or understate the painful memory many 
Chinese still sustain for the sake of their forefathers, but neither should one understate 
the role the PRC has played in writing of history; research on Manchukuo has, 
unfortunately, been harnessed to a great extent to political purposes. As Shao Dan and 
Ronald Suleski argue, post-war taboos have prevented discussion on what Manchukuo 
really meant to people except in strictly nationalistic interpretations, which has resulted 
in gaps in research.15 Naturally it has been beneficial to emphasize the sufferings of the 
people and the role of Communist protesters, and deny the improvements that were 
made in Manchuria during the Japanese occupation. An example of such nationalistic 
ethos is offered by an information board in the Museum of Occupation in Northeast (东
北沦陷史陈列馆) adjacent to the Puppet Emperor’s Palace in Changchun. It reads 
”When the beautiful land of China was parceled up and occupied, its people were 
plunged into abyss of misery. Brave and indignant people at all levels took up arms 
spontaneoulsy to resist the Japanese.”  
  
Japanese research on Manchukuo has been omitted for the simple reason that my 
Japanese skills are not competent enough. According to Rana Mitter, Japanese research 
on the matter is mainly divided into two factions; leftist research agrees, to a large 
extent, with the ethos of Chinese research. Rightist research, on the other hand, warmly 
reminisces about Japan’s glorious past and emphasizes Japan’s role in Manchukuo as a 
benefactor and modernizer 16. Fortunately, internationally the most prominent Japanese 
researchers, as have some Chinese researchers, publish their scholarly work also in 
English. Publications which are thus made available to larger international audiences are 
oftentimes more plausible than research in Japanese or especially in Chinese. This is 
 
15 Shao & Suleski, 2005, p. 1-2. 
16 Mitter, 2003, p. 146. 
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quite essential, as the topic of Manchukuo has, during the last decade or two, re-
emerged as a controversial topic of international dispute in the scholarly world.  
 
Earlier research: Manchus. Research on Manchus all over the world concentrates on 
the Qing period, whereas Manchus especially after the Qing Dynasty have been, to a 
large extent, ignored. In earlier Western English research on Qing-period Manchus the 
term “sinicization” has been applied to portray the process of rapproachement of 
Manchu and Han Chinese culture, the result of which has been considered the extinction 
of indigenous Manchu culture, and therefore Manchus have not gathered much 
interest.17 Shirokogoroff, who conducted field research in Aigun district by the Amur 
River for 18 months in 1917-1918, pointed out that instead on focusing on Manchus in 
Beijing and South Manchuria, which were both easily accessible areas at the time, 
researchers should venture to northern Manchuria where indigenous Manchu culture 
still existed. Unfortunately, not many heeded Shirokogoroff’s advice, and later on 
during the Manchukuo and early PRC period it became altogether quite impossible. 
Some Germans, as allies to the Japanese, managed to execute anthropological fieldwork 
in Manchuria during the Manchukuo period, but altogether such material on post-Qing 
Manchus is rather scarce. Furthermore, as Shao Dan points out, since after WWII 
Manchuria has been considered a territory that was recovered from foreign control and 
restored to China, and therefore Manchus have not enjoyed the same appeal as Tibetans 
or Uyghurs who have lost their autonomy18. Fortunately, since the late 1990’s this 
impression has been questioned, “Manchuness” has been foregrounded and the term 
“sinicization” has been criticized19. The scholars that support this critical view form the 
so-called ”New Qing School” which originates mainly from USA. 20  Prominent 
researchers who belong to this movement include Pamela Kyle Crossley, Edward 
Rhoads and Mark Elliot, to mention but a few. This Master’s Thesis is likewise based 
on their tradition. 
 
Chinese research on Manchus, albeit substantial, covers mainly the Qing period and 
emphasizes sinicization. Sustaining the controversy of profound sinicization on the 
other hand and indigenous Manchu culture on the other hand does not seem to be a 
 
17 Shao, 2011, p. 8. 
18 Shao, 2011, p. 3. 
19 see e.g. Crossley, 1990b and 1990a. 
20 Shao, 2011, p. 8-9. 
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dilemma for Chinese researchers. After emphasizing the similarity of Manchus and Han 
Chinese, most literature proceeds to describe indigenous Manchu clothings, songs and 
dishes. The question remains: who actually wears these clothes, sings these songs and 
eats these dishes if there is no difference between Manchus and Han Chinese 
whatsoever. Most Chinese research on Manchus avoids more serious questions such as 
what has been Manchus’ social status through time. This is especially true in the case of 
Manchukuo. The main notion is that Manchus contributed to the PRC to their utmost 
abilities and detested the Japanese invasion as any Han Chinese, condemning the very 
existence of Manchukuo21. This might be the case for many Manchus who stayed in 
China Proper, but hardly for all the Manchus in Manchukuo. As discussion on the latter 
group has been mainly ignored, with the exception of Puyi and other high-ranking 
Manchus, Chinese research on the matter is once again rendered quite useless. As Mark 
Elliot lamented the phenomenon, “ideologically charged nature of scholarship in the 
People’s Republic of China and Taiwan has limited the freedom of most scholars to 
explore alternative to mechanical Marxist or chauvinist narratives of Manchu history.”22 
Portion of Chinese research on Manchus has been conducted by members of the 
Manchu minority, but majority of this research likewise concentrates on Manchu 
language and the Qing Dynasty. 
 
In toto, research published in English on both Manchukuo and on Manchus has 
experienced a new wave during the last two decades. However, only few scholars have 
decided to combine these two topics. Majority is content with repeating that not much is 
known about Manchus in Manchukuo. For example Pamela Kyle Crossley’s The 
Manchus (1997), which seems to be meant as a generic introduction to the topic, 
provides only few sentences on Manchus in Manchukuo. The most prominent exception 
is certainly Shao Dan’s Remote homeland, recovered borderland: Manchus, 
Manchoukuo, and Manchuria, 1907-1985 published in 2011. In her exhaustive study 
she discusses the grave identity crisis Manchus suffered from one era to another. In a 
sense, this research paper aims to continue from where Shao Dan left off. While she 
concentrates on the question of who Manchus thought they were and what they thought 
their place in the society was, I aim to discuss how others defined and define Manchus 
and what place was given to them in the society.  
 
21 see e.g. Guan Shanfu, 1990, p. 5. 
22 Elliot, 2001, p. 31. 
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Sources. With the addition of few field studies done during, before or after Manchukuo 
in Manchuria, most prominently earlier mentioned Shirokogoroff’s Social organization 
of the Manchus (1924), latest English research articles and literature compose the bulk 
of the secondary sources. Primary sources consist of diaries, reports and newspapers, 
most of which are compiled in, during or about Manchukuo. Unfortunately, the main 
prerequisite for outlining the source materials is availability, which results in a focus on 
English material. Naturally source criticism is to be applied heavily – many European 
adventurers, missionaries and such who travelled in Manchukuo did not speak local 
languages, and some shared a feeling of superiority towards Asian “races”. However, 
many European accounts on Manchukuo include surprisingly insightful observations, 
which are taken into account in this paper. 
 
Structure of the thesis. This Master’s Thesis consists of an introduction, three 
subsequent chapters and a conclusion. The second chapter illuminates the historical 
background of Manchus and Manchuria before Manchukuo. The third chapter discusses 
Manchus in Manchukuo, and aims to answer very practical questions such as how many 
Manchus actually resided in Manchukuo, what did they do for a living, what was their 
relationship with other groups in Manchukuo, and so on. Shortly put, the aim of the 
third chapter is to reason why the original hypothesis was largely faulty. In order to put 
things into a wider historical context, modern Manchus and their situation is discussed 
briefly in chapter 3.3. Finally, the fourth chapter considers the conceptual problemacy 
that surrounds Manchus and questions the concepts that have been traditionally used to 
define them. 
 
Methods. In order to form a consistent narrative on Manchus in Manchukuo, methods 
of descriptive literature review and data collection are combined. Literature review is a 
method that has several objectives. Firstly, it aims to construct a general picture of the 
phenomenon. Secondly, it endeavors to describe a theory’s historical development, 
improve existing theories, and create new ones. Literature review is an instrumental tool 
in cumulating information, which is one of the basic objectives in research, but it can 
also be used in creating new information. No satisfactory account on Manchus in 
Manchukuo exists beforehand; therefore, compiling the information in chapter three has 
been both challenging and necessary. However, if one wished to fully understand the 
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conditions of Manchus in Manchukuo, conducting extensive fieldwork and archival 
research would be essential. Interviewing local Manchus, some of who have retained 
indigenous Manchu customs or even Manchu language, should be done without further 
delay. Unfortunately, within the confines of a Master’s Thesis this is simply not 
possible. Therefore, I ardently wish someone to take up the matter for further inspection 
in the near future.  
 
Terminology. In general, Chinese names and terms are written in pinyin, except in the 
cases where the term is most frequently seen in some other appearance, e.g. Sun Yat-sen 
or the Kwantung Army, instead of Sun Zhongshan and the Guandong Army. Japanese, 
Korean and Manchu terms are applied in the same form as in the source material.  
 12  
2. Historical background to Manchus and Manchukuo 
 
The subject at which I was worst was Manchu; I only learnt one word in all the years I 
studied it. This was yili (arise), the reply I had to make when my Manchu ministers knelt 
before me and said a set phrase of greeting in the language. 
 Aisin Gioro Puyi, 196423 
 
2.1. Manchus – from emperors to citizens 
 
Manchus originate from Jurchens, a Tungusic people who sported a nomadic hunting 
economy. A faction of Jurchen that resided on the east slope of Changbai Mountain rose 
in power in the 15th century and formed the Jianzhou Federation, which extended its 
power across the mountains, over the Jurchens and other tribal groups. 24  Besides 
Jianzhou, two other significant Jurchen Federations during the latter Ming period were 
the Haixi and the Yeren Federations or tribes25. In the turn of 16th and 17th centuries the 
Jianzhou Federation was led by Nurhaci, who was both a brilliant leader and clever 
diplomat. He was evidently born in 1559 in Hetu Ala, the residence of his father Taksi. 
Nurhaci furthered Jianzhou Federation’s supremacy; he moved the capital according to 
his conquests, unified the various Jurchen tribes and reorganized the scattered clans 
under his leadership.26  
  
In 1601 Nurhaci founded a military organization known as the banners (旗, qi), which 
was originally based on existing clan structure but later became the basic unit of Jurchen 
organization. Originally the banners were an umbrella organization that oversaw the 
operation of Qing military forces and the adjoining groups including soldiers, officers, 
servants and slaves. Only a portion of bannermen were combatant. Bannermen varied 
from Jurchen to Mongols, frontier Chinese, Koreans and even some Russians27. After 
the establishment of the banners, all bannermen were born into the banner affiliation of 
 
23 Aisin Gioro, 2010 (1989, 1964), p. 56. 
24 Huang, 2011, p. 1, Rigger 1995, p. 187-188. Aisin Gioro & Jin, 2007, p. 141. 
25 Enatsu, 2004, p. 13.  
26 Rigger, 1995, p. 188, Stary 1995, p. 1. 
27 Elliot, 2001, p. 39. 
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their fathers, and women changed banners when they changed family affiliation at the 
time of marriage.28 These people were taxed, administered and mobilized through their 
banners29. Nurhaci bolstered his power further in 1615 by setting the number of banners 
at eight (八旗，baqi) and appointing members of his family to lead each of them. The 
importance of the Eight Banners as the basic structure of Manchu organization has been 
researched creditably by Mark C. Elliot in the light of original Manchu-language 
documents (The Manchu way – the eight banners and ethnic identity in late imperial 
China, 2001). Generally speaking, during the Qing Dynasty all Manchus were banner 
people, except in the cases of depriving banner status as a punishment for criminal 
offence30. Until mid 18th century, all bannermen were considered Manchus in wide 
sense albeit the Eight Banners was a multiethnical corporation. Especially after 
conquering Ming towns Mukden (also known as Fengtian and Shenyang) and Liaoyang, 
the number of Han bannermen grew in such ferocity that Nurhaci had to create a new 
special banner for them, Hanjun. 31  Hanjun in Manchuria have been studied 
comprehensively by Enatsu Yoshiki (Banner legacy – the rise of the Fengtian local elite 
at the end of the Qing, 2004) who maintains that Hanjun composed the majority of 
bannermen in early 20th century Manchuria, and that some of these Hanjun as 
landowners were the local power holders of that time.  
 
In 1616 Nurhaci set himself as the first Khan of “Later Jin Dynasty”, the dynasty’s 
name being a tribute to the earlier Jin Dynasty (1115-1234), which Nurhaci believed to 
be founded by his Jurchen ancestors. Later Jin, however, was short lived in name for 
Nurhaci died in 1626 and was succeeded by his eighth son and heir Hong Taiji (also 
known apparently by the mistaken name Abahai), who changed the name of the Later 
Jin to Qing Dynasty in 1636. The name Qing (清) was possibly chosen as a counterpart 
to the name Ming (明) since the components in these characters represented opposite 
elements – water in qing and fire in ming. During the same year Hong Taiji designated 
that all who were loyal to him, without regard for their ancestry or custom, were to be 
called Manchus. Thus Manchus included a varied set of ethnicities from Han Chinese 
and Mongol bannermen and Jurchen; these original Manchus did not share ubiquitous 
 
28 Crossley, 1997, p. 7. 
29 Enatsu, 2004, p. 13.  
30 Shao, 2011, p. 30. 
31 Rigger, 1995, p. 189-190. 
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characteristics such as language, culture or biological traits.  The Jianzhou Federation 
continued to compose the core and leading cadre of this miscellaneous group.32 
 
Hong Taiji enforced the power of his clan Aisin Gioro by creating a mythical past that 
legislated its supremacy. According to the myth, Aisin Gioro ancestor Bukuri Yongson 
unified the warring tribes in northeast and was rewarded by being elected the leader the 
Jurchens on the east slope of Changbai Mountain. Bukuri Yongson was birthed by a 
heavenly maid Fekulen who was conceived after swallowing a fruit given by a magpie, 
spirit messenger from the Lord of Heaven.33 The purpose of this myth was to define 
Manchus as a creation of the Aisin Gioro clan, and whose existence could not be 
separated from the leadership of the Aisin Gioros. Being a Manchu meant especially 
being loyal to the Aisin Gioro clan and only secondarily practicing shamanistic rituals, 
speaking Manchu, training horse riding and archery, wearing side-buttoned clothing, 
eschewing footbinding and belonging to a clan with Manchu name.34  
 
The etymology of the term “Manchu” has been debated over centuries, but final 
conclusion on the matter has yet to be found. The Möllendorf translitteration “Manju” is 
closer to the actual pronunciation of the word, but due to inconsistent romanizations 
used in French and English literature during the 18th century, the term Manchu became 
established and is thus used until today. Today, Manchu in Chinese is manzu (满族), 
literally ”the ethnic group Manchu” or ”the Manchu tribe”. However, when Manchus 
originally realized the need to translate their name into Chinese, they chose the term 
manzhu (满珠), which had the approximate meaning of ”complete pearl”, a term that 
resonated quite neutrally with Han Chinese. Later, they decided to change the name into 
manzhou (满洲), ”full” or ”satisfied continents” in order to emphasize the unification of 
their dominion.35 
  
H. E. M. James, originally an officer in Indian Civil Service during latter 19th century, 
travelled in Manchuria in 1886-1887 and speculated that the name Manchu indicates 
either some mythical founder of the Qing Dynasty, or a name of a place the dynasty 
 
32 Huang, 2011, p. 2, Klieger, 2006, p. 216, Rigger, 1995, p. 191. 
33 Elliot, 2001, p. 44-46. 
34 Rigger 1995, p. 187-191. 
35 Shirokogoroff, 1924, p. 9-10. 
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sprang from36. According to Shirokogoroff, Manchu could be a clan name that ceased to 
exist at some point of time.37 Li Narangoa and many other modern-day researchers 
support the view that the term Manchu is of Tibetan origin, meaning “oriental 
brightness”; Manchu was an honorific title given by Mongol lamas to the sons of 
Nurhaci, and later Hong Taiji decided to use the term as a collective name for Jurchen 
tribes under his leadership.38 Perhaps one of the most fantastic explanations on the 
name’s origin, however, was uttered by a Chinese researcher E. C. Ning in 1929. 
According to him, the name Manchu stems from an experience gained by a barbarian 
chief during a struggle between eastern barbarians and the Chinese. The barbarian chief, 
possibly Hong Taiji himself, was pursued by Chinese soldiers and decided to hide in a 
pig sty. The Chinese soldiers could not find him, but declared “满猪” (man zhu, full of 
pigs). In memory of the event the barbarian chief decided to call his subjects manzhu, 
perhaps without knowing the actual meaning of the utterance.39 It is, however, very 
improbable that this tale has any basis in reality, although many Han Chinese 
undoubtedly wished it to be true. Instead, the story bears the very characteristics of 
Chinese sense of humor. 
 
The original Manchus spoke Manchu language, originally a Jurchen dialect that was 
spoken by the members of the Jianzhou Federation. Jurchen was a Tungusic language 
that belonged to Altaic languages and was closely related to Evenk, Gold, Orochon, 
Nani and other languages of the hunting and fishing peoples in Northeast Asia and 
Russian Maritime Province. Manchu is more distantly connected to languages such as 
Japanese, Korean and Mongolian, besides which Manchu drew loan words from 
Mongolian, Russian and Chinese among others. During the Qing Dynasty, the ability to 
write and speak Manchu gradually perished. In the 19th century only few outside 
Manchuria spoke any Manchu. Today, the Manchu language is on the brink of 
extinction, but the Manchu dialect Sibo (also known as Xibe or Xibo, 锡伯) is still 
spoken by about 30,000 people in Xinjiang.  
 
 
36 James, 1888, p. 23.  
37 Shirokogoroff, 1924, p. 9-10. 
38 Li Narangoa, 2002, p. 4.  
39 Ning, 1929, p. 4. 
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The first Jurchen writing system originated from the Khitan system, which in turn 
originated from the iconographic writing system of Chinese. This writing system 
disappeared from use during the Ming Dynasty at the latest. During the 16th century the 
phonetic Mongolian script was used to devise Jurchen a new writing system. This 
writing system, however, did not become largely used before 1630’s when circles and 
dots were added to complete the script. Thereafter, the Manchu writing system was 
called the ”circled and dotted script” and allowed, for the first time, writing to represent 
the actual sound of Manchu.40 
 
2.1.1. The rise of the Qing 
 
 
Bannermen under the leadership of Dorgon triumphed over Ming forces and the Qing 
dynasty succeeded Ming in 1644, Beijing as its capital. During the next years Manchu 
rule was consolidated and the proportions of the Qing Dynasty grew bigger than earlier 
dynasties’. In order to maintain these borders, Manchus founded banner garrisons in 
strategical locations all over China Proper and Manchuria, the result of which was the 
continuing heterogeneity of Manchus; instead of forming a homogenic group, Manchus 
who were separated by great distances commenced to integrate with the surroundings of 
the garrisons they habited. Shelley Rigger describes this Manchu dispersion by 
categorizing Qing-era Manchus into three classes: Qing ruling elite in Beijing, 
bannermen in garrisons and frontier Manchus who either stayed in Manchuria or 
returned there during the Qing Dynasty.41 Shirokogoroff, on the other hand, reported 
that Manchus themselves recognized three groups – the Ancient Manchus, the Modern 
Manchus and the Mongol-Manchus. The Ancient Manchus indicated those Manchus 
who moved southward and conquered China. The Modern Manchus meant Manchus 
who remained in Manchuria and joined the banners later. The Mongol-Manchus 
denoted those Mongols who were incorporated in the Manchu organization.42 For the 
purpose of this paper, the Rigger classification is applied. 
 
The Qing ruling elite had to make concessions to local conditions by depending on the 
earlier Ming governance; Manchu administration was originally based on joint decision 
 
40 Crossley, 1997, p. 33-35. 
41 Rigger, 1995.  
42 Shirokogoroff, 1924, p. 11. 
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making, for example in a Manchu institution called the Court of Colonial Affairs (Lifan 
Yuan) where the heads of each banner were members. The Court was initially imported 
to China Proper, but was soon overthrown by earlier local institutions and ways of 
government. Manchu conquerors understood that in order to rule China, Manchus had to 
adjust to the Chinese political tradition since the Chinese would hardly submit willingly 
to a totally alien rule. Secondly, the number of Manchus qualified for administrative 
posts was far too small in order to rule an area as extensive as China. Therefore, a large 
and growing number of administrative posts were filled either by the Hanjun bannermen 
or Han Chinese who had experience from administration during the Ming dynasty. 
Thirdly, in order to reassert the status of the Aisin Gioro clan, preferring Confucian 
ruler-subject –relationship was more favorable than the more equal way of Manchu 
power sharing.43 
 
As Chinese institutions were introduced to the Manchu rule, also the portrayal of 
Manchus was changed. Originally Manchus were a varied, inclusive set of ethnicities 
that shared a common political goal of overthrowing the Ming dynasty, but Kangxi 
emperor (r. 1662-1722) replaced this description with an exclusive notion that centered 
on common ancestry and culture. Qianlong emperor (r. 1736-1795) further developed 
Kangxi’s ideas by initiating a full reregistration of Hanjun. Bannermen who could not 
prove their ancestry back to the Jianzhou Federation were to be pushed back to the Han 
and Mongol categories. In order to support this,  Qianlong emperor also ordered the 
compilation of ”Researches on Manchu origin” (满洲源流考, Manzhou yuanliu kao) 
that codified clan histories and genealogies, standardized Manchu mythology and 
shamanistic practices and highlighted the fictional link between Jin and Qing dynasties. 
The aim of these projects was to emphasize the Manchus’ social and historical role in 
order to better tie them into the imperial system and under the unquestionable rule of the 
Aisin Gioro clan44. 
 
In order to keep Manchus and Han Chinese separate and thus reassert Manchus’ 
superiority, the Manchu rulers tried to sustain indigenous Manchu characteristics, but by 
formalizing Manchu culture they in reality stunted its flourishment altogether. The 
ruling elite chose some symbolic elements such as shamanistic rituals and martial 
 
43 Rigger 1995, p. 192-196. 
44 Rigger, 1995, p. 194-195. Crossley, 1997, p. 122-125. 
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tradition to represent Manchus, but these elements were increasingly non-apparent in 
normal Manchu life. While the Qing ruling elite governed according to Confucian 
values, spoke Chinese and dressed like Chinese, emperor and his Manchu advisers were 
mandated to take part in occasional ceremonial and recreational hunts. Bannermen had 
neither interest nor resources to do the same.  
 
The restricting circumstances created by the formalization of Manchu culture, however, 
burdened especially the frontier Manchus who had stayed in Manchuria during and after 
the conquest of Ming Dynasty.45 During the conquest of China the area of Manchuria 
was largely depopulated and soon after closed to Han immigration in order to preserve 
the Manchus’ ancestral land. The frontier Manchu were impoverished banner 
population that was regarded by the Qing ruling elite as the “pure Manchus”, but 
nevertheless enjoyed less privileges than their kin in garrisons elsewhere. In order to 
preserve the Manchu identity, the Qing ruling elite denied the frontier Manchus access 
to education and possibilities to develop with the rest of the Qing Dynasty. After 
establishing the Qing, Manchus were also forbidden to practice trades or take part in 
commerce. Furthermore, the frontier Manchus could not compete as farmers with illegal 
Han immigrants who had more experience in agriculture, and as uneducated they were, 
governmental career was improbable. Therefore majority of the frontier Manchu lived 
as absentee landlords and were heavily dependent on government stipends that were 
initiated in 1656 and continued as late as the 20th century. Although the Qing ruling elite 
seemingly praised Manchuria as their ancestral home, the unfortunate situation of the 
frontier Manchu ensured that they would hardly use Manchuria as a base for conquest of 
China as the ancestors of Qing ruling elite had done in the 17th century.46 
 
Similarily, the Manchu bannermen in garrisons were denied from taking part in 
agriculture, trade and commerce. Such fields of operation were not considered worthy 
of Manchus, and therefore some lived their whole lives unemployed. Even the 
garrisons’ military role decreased when the importance of Chinese Army of “Green 
Standard” increased. However, because the Manchu population increased and their 
standard of living worsened, since 18th and 19th centuries bannermen were gradually 
allowed to apply for permission to seek private employment and live outside the 
 
45 Klieger, 2006, p. 216, Rigger 1995, p. 197. 
46 Rigger, 1995, p. 200-201. 
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garrison walls, but at the same time retain their banner registration. Albeit this was 
practically an unavoidable solution, Qianlong emperor and the Qing ruling elite saw it 
also as a threat. Qianlong emperor once complained “There could be difficulties in 
ordering the bannermen who normally worked as noodle vendors, sedan-chair carriers, 
carpenters, or ferry-men to catch up weapons and move against their neighbours or 
employers should the need arise”.47 
 
In other words, the pursuit to unify Manchus and revive the “Manchu Way” of Manchu 
language, military skills, origin myths, customs and practices was ultimately 
unsuccessful. Manchus continued to be a heterogenous and increasingly unequal unit of 
people.48 However, it seems that even the most underprivileged Manchus continued to 
be proud of their status as the higher class in the Qing Dynasty. Manchus were unified 
mainly by this identification, and on practical level by the stipends that were paid to all 
Manchu males of certain age who could draw a bow. 
 
2.1.2. The fall of the Qing 
 
The Qing Dynasty met its demise in 1911-1912 due to several internal and external 
reasons that had emerged during its reigning centuries. Originally the Qing Dynasty 
stabilized central China, which had been previously afflicted by rebellions and 
agricultural shortages. During the Qing Dynasty, recovering farming lands, opening of 
previously uncultivated land and restoration and expansion of infrastructure was 
encouraged. This, however, resulted in a gigantic leap in population, which in turn led 
to immigration movements, unemployment and homelessness. By the 18th century, 
increasing agriculture caused deforestation, erosion and soil exhaustion in Central and 
Western China.49  
 
Furthermore, the status of foreigners in Qing Empire and the infamous Opium Wars 
attenuated the sovereignty of the Qing Dynasty. The self-sufficient Qing Dynasty had 
little interest in buying goods from Europe, while in European countries there was a 
great demand for Chinese products such as tea and silk. This resulted in a trade deficit, 
 
47 Crossley, 1997, p. 127-128, p. 130. 
48 Shao, 2011, p. 23. 
49 Crossley, 1997, p. 151-152. 
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which was solved by the United Kingdom by selling opium to the increasingly addicted 
population of the Qing Empire. Also many members of the Qing elite, banner officials 
and highest civil officials fell victim to the addictive power of the opium. Rich people 
were pawning their fortunes and poor people were selling their children in order to 
receive their daily dosages. The Qing court decided to proceed to put an end to the 
opium business, which resulted in the First Opium War in 1839-1842. The Qing 
Dynasty with their primitive and unreliable war equipment had little chance against the 
modern British fleet. The defeat in the Opium war resulted in the Treaty of Nanjing 
between the Qing Empire and the Great Britain in 1842. 50  The re-unstabilized 
conditions and the enroachment of foreign powers gave birth to several rebellions and 
turned the public opinion against the Qing rulers and Manchus in general. Especially the 
Boxer Rebellion in 1900 turned out to be devastating for frontier Manchus in 
Manchuria. Shirokogoroff reported that the Manchu population in the Aigun district 
sustained great losses. Thousands of them fled to Southern Manchuria and returned 
months later only to find their homes in ashes. They had lost their property including the 
clan lists that were vital in organizing clan activities.51 
 
Acknowledging the rising hostility Han Chinese subjects felt towards their Manchu 
rulers, in the early 20th century the Qing ruling elite set about to lower the social 
inequality between Manchus and Hans. Few years before the demise of the Qing 
Dynasty, the empress dowager Ci Xi started to favour intermarriage between Manchus 
and Hans, equalized punishments to Manchus and Hans, and allowed Manchus to travel 
freely and take part in trade similarily to Han Chinese. Ci Xi further adviced viceroys 
and governors of all provinces to employ Manchus and Hans without distinction.52 The 
change in policy was, however, too little too late. Finally, the massive civil disorder in 
the early 20th century resulted in Wuchang Uprising in October 10th in 1911, which led 
to the founding of a new government, the Republic of China (ROC). On January 1, 
1912, Sun Yat-sen formally announced the establishment of ROC. After a round of 
negotiations, the child emperor Puyi was abdicated and the Qing Dynasty came to its 
end officially on February 2th, 1912.53 
 
 
50 Crossley, 1997, p. 154-156. 
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2.1.3. Manchus after the Qing  
 
In order to avoid a prolonged conflict, the republican revolutionaries settled in an 
agreement with the Qing Dynasty’s ruling elite. The Qing was to transmit its authority 
over to the Republican government, and the government would deal with the abdicated 
emperor generously according to the Articles of Favourable Treatment54 . Puyi was 
allowed to inhabit the premises in the Forbidden City until 1924, after which he fled to 
the Japanese concession in Tianjin. However, the situation was greatly graver for 
Manchus in lower positions and in banner garrisons all around China Proper. The fall of 
the Qing Dynasty came with the persecution and even mass murder of Manchus. 
Garrison walls were demolished and many bannermen left homeless. As legal adviser 
and author Percy Horace Kent noted in 1912, “No human sentiment of pity could stay 
their dreadful fate… shot down, sabered, committed suicide, burned alive, fled to be 
butchered elsewhere.”55 Or as Mark Elliot put it, “Manchus in all parts of China found 
themselves dispossesed, disfranchised, discriminated, and, in many places, 
disemboweled.”56.   
 
However, the devastating revolution had less influence in the lives of Manchus in 
Manchuria. They did not face any large-scale violence or strong anti-Manchu sentiment, 
because the local Manchu-Han demarcation was not that prominent. Manchuria was 
naturally multiethnic, and the large number of Hanjun bannermen in Manchuria acted as 
a barrier and lessened the inequality between Manchus and Hans. Furthermore, 
Manchus in Manchuria were not required to live inside garrison walls. Instead, 
especially nearing the end of the Qing Dynasty, the differences between Manchus and 
civilians in Manchuria became increasingly insignificant. A growing number of 
Manchus were involved in agriculture rather than military life.57  
 
In order to avoid further persecution, many disarmed bannermen and their families in 
China Proper assumed Chinese names, claimed Chinese ancestry and enrolled in 
Chinese armies.58 Shifting household registration was relatively easy in a legal sense, 
 
54 Rhoads, 2000, p. 232. 
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but harder for those who simply could not hide their identity, such as members of the 
imperial household among others.59 As the population of Manchus thus plummeted, 
speculation on the total extinction of Manchus ran wild in Western media. New York 
Times reported in 1928 that  ”Within a few decades, it seems evident, the Manchus will 
have ceased to exist as a separate race and will have been entirely merged with the 
Chinese…” 60 . Some went as far as comparing Manchus to the Indians of North 
America, ”for they are a dying race”61. The payment of the Eight Banner stipends 
continued partly in a reduced fashion until as late as 192462, but ordinary bannermen 
who ceased to receive these stipends found it very difficult to get by. These destitute 
Manchus constituted one of the biggest social problems in the ROC society. In order to 
increase their employment, different sorts of job training institutions and textile 
factories were founded. Majority of Manchus continued to reside in Beijing, and some 
of them fled to Manchuria. There is, however, no information whatsoever on how many 
Manchus actually moved to Manchuria during the ROC period.63 
  
 
59 Elliot, lecture 2012. 
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2.2. Manchuria – a contested realm 
 
 
Manchuria has always been an integral part of China ever since 2235 B.C. 
E. C. Ning, 192964 
 
Manchuria has always constituted a special territory, geographically and historically 
distinct from China Proper. 
The Japanese Government, 193365 
 
As a historical entity, however, it is a region under constant evolution connected with 
internal and external political developments. 
Juha Janhunen, 199666 
 
 
The area of Manchuria consists of approximately 2,7 million square kilometers. 
According to Janhunen, the total sphere of Manchuria is even wider. Besides the 
Continental Manchuria (in other words, the Manchuria Proper), the Greater Manchuria 
further includes the Peninsular Manchuria, which embodies areas such as Liaodong and 
the insular belt of Sakhalin and Japan.67 Janhunen further separates the concepts of the 
physical reality and historical entity of Manchuria; while the physical reality has been 
relatively stable through centuries, the historical entity has undergone constant political 
change.68 The events that influenced and led into the founding of the Manchukuo state 
are representative of such political fluctuation.  
 
During the Manchukuo era, the historical claim to the area of Manchuria was considered 
a prime justification both against and for the sovereignty of Manchukuo. Today, it is 
widely accepted that Manchuria has been, for a prolonged time period, more or less 
integral part of China, as is de facto situation at the moment. The predominance of 
sinocentered scholarship has undoubtedly contributed to this state of affairs. However, 
the issue of Manchuria’s “ownership” was greatly more controversial until as late as the 
 
64 Ning, 1929, p. 19. 
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67 Janhunen, 1996, p. 6. 
68 Janhunen, 1996, p. 8-9. 
 24  
end of WWII. During the Manchukuo period, Japanese officials oftentimes emphasized 
the separateness of Manchuria from China proper, while Chinese sported the view that 
China and Manchuria had an ancient link that entitled Manchuria to China. The 
opinions are likewise polarized in English language secondary sources such as journals 
and newspapers. For example Harry Hussey, an architect and observer based in Beijing, 
stated in 1933 that “Manchuria … was very definitely incorporated as the integral part 
of China by the Manchus, and such it has remained to this day”69 while George Bronson 
Rea, a Washington adviser to the Manchukuo government, argued in 1935 that “No 
rational being would dispute the absolute right of the Manchus to sovereignty over their 
homeland up to that year [1911]”.70 This chapter takes a look into the contested history 
of Manchuria, since the strategical importance that Manchuria has played in East-Asian 
history for centuries had also an unavoidable impact on the situation of Manchus in 
Manchukuo. As Shao Dan argues, Manchuria as a borderland is a zone of conquest and 
contact, which results in relationship between the locals and regimes being constantly 
redefined71.  
 
2.2.1 Inventing Manchuria 
 
 
The idea of Manchuria is comparatively new; it was devised as late as in the beginning 
of 17th century when Manchus started their political expansion. According to Janhunen, 
it is improbable that before that time the region “existed as a coherent entity in the 
consciousness of its inhabitants”.72 However, since the 17th century Manchus aspired to 
emphasize the distinctions between Manchu elite and Han Chinese subjects by 
identifying the vast area in question as their homeland Manchuria, an enterprise aided 
by Jesuit cartographers.73 
 
During and after the conquest of the Ming Empire, the majority of Manchus emigrated 
from Manchuria to China Proper, and within twenty years the area faced near complete 
depopulation. The Veritable Records of the Qing dynasty, quoted by Shao Dan, 
proclaimed, “I saw abandoned towns and castles, collapsed houses and walls. On the 
 
69 Hussey, 1933, p. 8. 
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73 Li Narangoa, 2002, p. 4. 
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vast expense of this fertile land, there were no people.”74 At first, in order to populate 
the vacated area, emigration from China Proper to Manchuria was encouraged. This 
policy, however, was forfeited in 1740 when immigration was forbidden altogether. On 
an ideological level, the Manchu rulers wanted to preserve Manchuria as their pure 
ancestral land free from foreign influence. On a more practical level, suspending the 
immigration protected the interests of local Manchus who had had favourable 
connections with the Qing rulers since the late Ming Dynasty.75 Willow Palisades, a 
curious system of ditches and embankments planted with willows, was erected on some 
areas between China Proper and Manchuria in order to enforce this policy. However, 
Han Chinese from nearby areas such as Shandong and Hubei carried on immigrating to 
Manchuria especially on a seasonal basis for agricultural migrant work. The 
immigration policy was once again reversed in the 19th century in order to solve 
domestic economic problems and strengthen the Qing Empire’s northeastern border 
against Russian expansion. An influx of Han Chinese immigrants that followed changed 
the demographics of Manchuria irreversibly, and local Manchus became quickly a 
minority. 76 Albeit Manchus in China proper considered Manchuria the home of their 
ancestors, they were not enthusiastic to immigrate to this northern and destitute region. 
Likewise the Qing ruling elite had no plans to return, altough after the demise of the 
Qing Dynasty some of them re-discovered the potential of Manchuria as a base from 
which to re-found the Qing. 77  Attitudes towards Manchuria were altogether 
contradictory. For example criminals were often exiled to Manchuria.78 
 
Until the enormous immigration movements in the 19th century, Manchuria’s special 
position as the ancestral Manchu homeland was sustained by a separate administrative 
system as well as a series of policies that categorized the banner people there – the 
frontier Manchus and Hanjun – differently from the rest of the banner system. Mukden 
(present day Shenyang, previously known as Fengtian) was treated as the vice-capital of 
the Manchu empire, and out of the Six Boards in Beijing five had counterparts in 
Manchuria, in other words the Boards of Revenue, Rites, War, Justice and Works. 
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However, since the mid 19th century Manchuria was regarded increasingly as a territory 
of the Empire rather than as a homeland of Manchus.79 
 
2.2.2 Spheres of influence and interest 
 
Althought Manchuria is now considered an inseparable part of the PRC, it can be 
argued that this situation is mainly a result of the Han Chinese immigration movement 
that grew into substansial proportions during the 19th century, rather than some ancient 
historical claim for the area.  
 
Owen Lattimore divides Manchuria into Chinese, Korean and Mongolian spheres. 
According to Lattimore, Southern Manchuria has had a close connection to China 
Proper since as early as 300 BC, an argument supported by neolithic evidence and 
similarities in culture. However, western plains of Manchuria have been more closely 
connected with Mongolia instead, while the forested mountains in the east have been 
part of the ancient kingdom of Goguryeo (37 BC – 668 AD), which Lattimore 
associates with Korea.80 Nevertheless, the interaction between Manchuria and Korean 
kingdoms and later modern Koreas has continued until today on immigrational and 
economical levels. 
 
As mentioned earlier, the Russian expansion in Siberia and the formation of Sino-
Russian border in the 19th century increased Manchuria’s strategical importance in 
international politics, which urged the Qing ruling elite to reverse their immigration 
policies in Manchuria in order to better integrate the area into the rest of the empire. 
Manchuria, however, had little chance to resist foreign influence, and it received little 
help from rest of the Empire whose military and financial resources were not up to par. 
Therefore not only Russia, but also several Western countries and Japan had free reigns 
to pursue their interests in Manchuria.  
 
Following the years of Meiji Restoration in 1868, Japan endeavoured to build a larger 
empire, and established its presence in Manchuria as a result of its conquests in East 
Asia and the first Sino-Japanese war in 1894. The turn of the century was further 
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characterized by rivarly between Russia and Japan, when Russia conquered the whole 
area during the Boxer Rebellion of 1900. Japan, however, challenged Russia’s control 
of the area succesfully in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. Since then, the Qing 
Empire and later the ROC had little influence in Manchuria.81 As a result of the war, 
Japan acquired the leased territory of Kwantung and extraterritorial rights to the South 
Manchurian Railway Zone, which was a strip of land that followed the South 
Manchurian Railway tracks. Based on these acquisitions, Japan founded two of its most 
important agencies in Manchuria and, later on, in Manchukuo – the Kwantung Army 
and the South Manchurian Railway Company. The division of Manchuria into Russian 
and Japanese spheres of influence manifested most visibly in the two railroad systems: 
the northern Chinese Eastern Railway owned by Russia and the southern South 
Manchurian Railway owned by Japan.82  
 
The South Manchurian Railway Company (SMRC, also known as Mantetsu) was 
founded in 1906. SMRC was not only a railroad company, but quickly expanded its 
enterprises to include coalmines, construction, education, research, logistics and so on. 
Since 1920’s onwards also several branches and joint ventures were founded by SMRC, 
such as Manchukuo Film Association Ltd. in 1937. During the 1920’s SMRC provided 
over a quarter of the Japanese Government’s tax revenues83. In 1936, SMRC employed 
146 000 people including Japanese, Koreans and Manchurians. In a leaflet published by 
SMRC in 1936 its role is defined rather dramatically as ”the carrier of the light of 
civilization into Manchuria”.84 
 
Japan futher consolidated its influence after the 1911 Revolution and during the regime 
of warlord Zhang Zuolin that followed. Zhang Zuolin’s grand scheme of conquering 
China Proper and restoring the Qing Dynasty, however, collided with Japanese plans, 
and he was finally assassinated in 1928. His son and successor Zhang Xueliang, 
however, was even less enthusiastic to co-operate with Japanese, and ardently supported 
Chiang Kai-shek and Kuomintang.85  
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The internal struggle in the newly founded ROC and the Open Door Policy futher 
allowed foreign countries to establish their presence in Manchuria. Its population 
became increasingly multinational and multiethnical. The Kwantung Army was anxious 
for Japan to achieve some kind of resolution in Manchuria, but the Japanese 
Government was slow to decide on the matter. Finally, in order to ensure dominance in 
Manchuria, the Japanese Kwantung Army set out to invade the whole Manchuria once 
and for all by staging an infamous event known as the Mukden Incident (also referred to 
as the Manchurian Incident) in the night of 18.9.1931; a group of Japanese soldiers 
exploded a part of Japanese-owned railway line, accused Chinese for it, and the 
Kwantung Army used this as an excuse to capture the three eastern provinces by 1933. 
The Japanese Government acknowledged this as something that had de facto happened, 
and there was no reversing it. It has been disputed whether these soldiers acted on their 
own, and if not, on whose orders. Nevertheless, soon after the cabinet of Tokyo was 
changed into a more jingoist one, and the conquest of Manchuria began to be seen as a 
positive prospect to be exploited.  
 
Manchukuo was founded on 18th of February, 1932. The Declaration of Independence 
promised in a grandiose manner that the era of chaos, disorder and corruption has come 
to an end, and a new order shall begin. According to the declaration, “Several months 
have already elapsed since the outbreak of the incident in the Northeastern Provinces. 
The desire of the populace for the restoration of peace is like that of the hungry for food 
and the thirsty for water, and it is now their most earnest hope that there shall come a 
complete regeneration and new birth.”86 Manchukuo received almost immediately a 
strongly polarized reaction in Western countries. Some identified it as a puppet of 
Japan, while others praised it as a wonder of modern state construction. The puppet 
status of Manchukuo is further discussed in chapter 3.1.1.  
 
86 Manchukuo Government, 1932, p. 1-2. 
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3. Manchus and Manchukuo 
 
Manchuria in the 1920’s and 1930’s was a harsh, unromantic place. The northern 
region especially could be compared to the Wild West of North America – tough, 
testing, and lawless. In Manchuria, bandits took the place of outlaws, and opium was 
used instead of whiskey. But the Northeast lacked the glamour of the West – there were 
no cowboys, sheriffs, or Diamond Lils.  
 Thomas Gottschang & Diana Lary, 200087 
 
”What I saw in Manchuria this time did not exist when I was there during the regime of 
Chang Hsueh-liang. There are many schools, wonderful roads which are rapidly being 
extended, a monetary system, industrial and agricultural development, building 
construction, marvellous city planning, and a host of other things that had never existed 
before. The work of the Government and military authorities is amazing and 
Manchoukuo is one of the great centres of the world which bears watching. The work 
carried on there is actual and real. The experiment in statecraft there can be called a 
wonder of the age.”  
Francis W. Clarke, cited in 193688 
 
3.1. Manchukuo – the Child of Conflict 
 
Today, Manchukuo is known only to few Westerners, but during its existence 
Manchukuo gathered vast international interest and dispute. Those missionaries, 
journalists, political advisers and adventurers who travelled in Manchukuo and wrote 
about it left behind very contradictory statements on the nature of this ”World’s Newest 
Nation”, ”Jewel of Asia”, ”Child of Conflict” or “Switzerland of the Far East”. 
Manchukuo was ethnically versatile, politically controversial, economically promising 
and both mysterious and unknown to most Europeans and Americans.  
 
 
87 Gottschang & Lary, 2000, p. 133. 
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Manchukuo was a single-party state under nominal constitutional monarchy. The 
nominal head of state was Puyi, the last emperor of the Qing Dynasty, who acted as 
Chief Executive from 1932 to 1934, and, when he finally had his greatest wish fulfilled, 
as Emperor Kangde from 1934 to 1945. The highest political organ was the Government 
whose ministers were mainly local Han Chinese and, to a lesser degree, locals from 
other ethnicities such as Koreans, Mongols and Manchus. Most of them, as Enatsu 
points out, were local power holders and influential landowners already before 193289. 
Some ministers were Han Chinese Qing veterans from China Proper. However, it seems 
that in practice the Japanese vice-ministers, and finally the leaders of the Kwantung 
Army, conducted most policy-making. There was no direct connection between the 
Manchukuo Government and Japanese Government; instead the Kwantung Army had 
relatively high power in Manchukuo’s politics as a middleman90. The South Manchurian 
Railway Company maintained its enterprises, such as managing rail transportation, 
freight business, research and education, after the establishment of Manchukuo. Due to 
SMRC’s humanitarian goal, its oftentimes leftist employees mixed uneasily with the 
Kwantung Army officers who represented the rightist imperial presence and ideals.91 
This regurarly resulted in contradictory actions of different authorities.92  
 
The official state ideologies of Manchukuo included neo-traditionalist concepts such as 
Pan-Asianism (亚细亚注意 Yaxiyazhuyi), Harmony between the five races (五族协和 
Wuzuxiehe) and the Kingly Way (王道 Wangdao). Pan-Asianism was a Japanese idea 
of the unification of all Asian races under the leadership of Japanese as the ultimate 
race, whose duty was to lead them to a greater future. The Japanese felt especially jaded 
when they were not treated equally in the League of Nations, which further fuelled the 
Asians versus Westerners –dichotomy. The harmony between the five races, on the 
other hand, was an ideology derived originally from Sun Yat-sen93, and it stated that the 
five main races in Manchukuo – Japanese, Manchus, Han Chinese, Mongols and 
Koreans – were to live equally in harmony. The constitution of Manchukuo reads 
“There shall be no discrimination with respect to race and caste among those people 
who now reside within the territory of the new State. Besides the races of the Hans, 
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Manchus, Mongols, Japanese and Koreans, the peoples of other foreign countries may 
upon application have their rights guaranteed.” 94  The five colours in the flag of 
Manchukuo represent these five races (see appendix A, page 82). In reality, Manchukuo 
was never engineered to be a nation state solely for the Manchus, granted that the name 
of the state is derived from Manchus and Manchuria. Instead, Manchukuo was designed 
as a multiethnical state in the style of Canada. The Concordia Association, an umbrella 
organization under the Manchukuo government, was founded in 1931 in order to 
promote Pan-Asianism and multiculturalism evident in Manchukuo, and most of all 
legitimize the new state95. The Kingly Way was a traditional Confucian idea about the 
duties of the sovereign, and at first Puyi felt very obliged to follow this ideology, but 
discarded it after realizing how little he could impact Manchukuo’s policies96. The 
actual implementation of these ideologies was dubious at best. The Japanese sense of 
self-importance was oftentimes in direct conflict with any harmony between the races97. 
As Mitter summarizes, “in the initial period the Japanese were keen to use persuasion 
rather than coercion where they could in order to stabilize the new state”. However, the 
Japanese way of ruling became harsher especially after the promotion of mass migration 
to Manchukuo in 1936 and the beginning of war between China and Japan in 193798. 
There was little space for Kingly Ways and virtuous ruling99 – Manchukuo became 
increasingly a supplier for the Japanese war machine and decreasingly a development 
project that it had been in the 1920’s and earlier half of 1930’s when SMRC had a more 
decisive role in the area.  
 
After the establishment, the capital was moved from Mukden to Changchun (长春), 
which was renamed Xinjing (新京), literally “The New Capital“ (see appendix B, page 
83, the map of Manchukuo). Xinjing was located in a strategical and central place in the 
Manchurian railway network and nearer to Japan’s colony of Korea. The ancient 
Manchu capital of Mukden lost its earlier position. Therefore changing the capital had 
both practical and symbolical meaning.100 The Manchukuo area consisted of about 1,3 
million km², or as many contemporary accounts on Manchukuo demonstrated, 
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approximately the combined area of contemporary Germany and France.101 The area of 
Manchukuo was also somewhat expanded in the course of its existence. Most prominent 
additions included the Province of Jehol in 1933 (also known as Rehe), an area which 
today is divided between Hebei, Liaoning and Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region.  
 
The population of Manchukuo was about 30 million when the state was founded, but 
rose up to about 40-50 million during its existence. Demographics are quite unreliable 
and therefore should be viewed as merely suggestive, but the area of Manchuria was, 
before and during the Manchukuo period, undoubtedly a target of one of the most 
extensive immigration movements known in human history. The unstable conditions in 
China Proper during the 1930’s and 1940’s encouraged an influx of Han Chinese 
immigrants who sought better prospects in Manchuria. These Chinese farmers and some 
smaller local ethnic groups lived mostly in rural areas, while more international 
population settled in cities. For example, according to the Manchukuo Government, in 
1933 Harbin was inhabited by Chinese, Taiwanese, Soviets, white Russians, Japanese, 
Koreans, Brits, Americans, Germans, Italians, Poles, Jews, Greeks, Turks, Austrians, 
Hungarians, Danes, Latvians, Portuguese, Czechs, Armenians, Belgians, Serbs, Swedes, 
Romanians, Swiss, Indians, not to mention Mongols, Manchus and other Tungus 
groups.102 Manchukuo was indeed a melting pot in the making. Japanese influence was 
concentrated on larger towns and cities, which were part of the railroad network, and 
therefore also most of the development occurred in cities.  
 
3.1.1 Manchukuo – a puppet state? 
 
In order to fully comprehend the situation Manchus were in in Manchukuo, it is 
important to consider the implications on Manchukuo’s status as Japan’s puppet state. 
After all, nominating Manchukuo a puppet state has resulted in staggering gaps in 
research, such as a shortage of analyses on Manchus in Manchukuo. Furthermore, in 
order to shed light on the complexity of Manchus’ situation in Manchukuo, it is quite 
imperative to take discussion on Manchukuo’s political state of affairs into account.  
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As Li Narangoa and Robert Cribb point out, the term ”puppet state” appears to have 
entered English language originally as the description of Manchukuo. However, the 
phenomenon indicated is much older and prevalent than this etymology suggests. The 
term puppet state is oftentimes used to denote the nominally independent states created 
within the Japanese and German empires during WWII. However, already at the end of 
the 18th century Napoleon founded several likewise nominally independent republics in 
parts of Europe not annexed to France, for example the Batavian, Helvetic, Cisalpine, 
Ligurian and Parthenopaen Republics. Furthermore, the Soviet Russia and later Soviet 
Union established multiple similar states such as Tannu Tuva and the short-lived Far 
Eastern Republic, but these were generally called satellites rather than puppets. States 
connected to the United States in the same fashion, on the other hand, have generally 
been called neo-colonies or client states instead.103  
 
Outwardly, Manchukuo was certainly a sovereign state. It had legislative, executive and 
judicial systems of government aided by Japanese advisers. It had formal symbols of an 
independent state, such as declaration of independence, a head of state, a national flag 
and anthem, and a capital. However, according to two definitions of ”puppet state” 
described by Suk-Jung Han, Manchukuo was indeed a puppet. According to the 
standard definition, a puppet state is a country whose major political decisions are made 
by a foreign government or a hegemon. According to the socialist definition, a puppet 
state is a country that allows stationing of foreign troops or has military links with great 
powers for its defence – a notion used especially by North Korea to portray South 
Korea. 104 The strong Japanese presence in Manchukuo and the undeniable influence of 
the Kwantung Army in local policymaking resulted in a cacophony of reactions from 
other nations. Partly due to the unawareness of the actual situation in Manchukuo, the 
issue aroused numerous opinions. For example in Finland, the Patriotic People’s 
Movement (Isänmaallinen kansanliike), a nationalist and anti-communist political party, 
applauded Japan for saving Manchuria from the chaos that China had plummeted in. 
The other extreme was represented by parties such as the Agrarian League 
(Maalaisliitto) and the Social Democratic Party of Finland (SDP), who condemned 
Japanese presence in Manchuria and saw the foundation of Manchukuo outright 
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unscrupulous in nature.105  Such disharmonious political climate on the Manchukuo 
issue was comparable to several other Western states. However, as Suk-Jung Han points 
out, according to both standard and socialist definitions most states in the 20th century 
would be puppet states.106 Negative approach to Manchukuo was undoubtedly fuelled 
by the publication of so-called Tanaka Memorial (1927), which was allegedly 
composed by Japanese civil and military officials in a conference in Mukden and later 
fell into Chinese hands. According to the memorial, the Japanese planned to first 
conquer Manchuria, then China Proper, Soviet Union, the bases in Pacific and finally 
the whole world. However, today the Tanaka Memorial is seen as a forgery and a Soviet 
trick to get Japan and China to attack each other in order to provide Soviet Union with 
better footing. The Japanese original of the memorial has never been found.107 
 
Albeit sovereignty composes a formal principle of international affairs, ”at the best the 
right of independence is, and always has been, the right of the most powerful”, as 
Professor Sterling Edmunds argued108. It can be concluded that Manchukuo was not 
exceptional in its lack of so-called true independence. Manchukuo was not officially a 
sovereign state because it did not receive international recognition. In reality, however, 
Manchukuo did achieve certain form of sovereignty; the Manchukuo Government 
oftentimes resisted Tokyo – its own metropole, as Suk-Jung Han conveyed.109 It should 
be noted that Manchukuo, unlike earlier Japanese conquests of Hokkaido, Okinawa and 
Korea, was not directed under strong Japanization measures. Instead, Japan was merely 
placed in the summit of the hierarchical order while other institutions from the pre-
occupation era were left mainly intact 110 . Suk-Jung Han furthermore suggests that 
Manchukuo presents a complex and flexible nature of sovereignty since its sovereignty 
was given from the outside. Manchukuo Government’s pursuit to establish Manchukuo 
as an independent state was easily papered over internationally and in China Proper by 
nominating Manchukuo a puppet state. The concept of puppet state was a convenient 
way to endorse Manchuria as an integral part of China and whose residents had no real 
intention to keep the area separated from China Proper, and therefore the historical 
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narrative of Manchukuo as a prime example of a puppet state has remained generally 
accepted until today. 
 
One of the basic contemporary and modern arguments in debate surrounding 
Manchukuo’s sovereignty, as discussed in chapter 2.2., is indeed the question of the 
historical claim to Manchuria. The answer is certainly not unambiguous. One of the 
underlying notions of the anti-Manchuism that flourished in China Proper in the 
beginning of the 20th century was that Manchus were foreigners whose actual homeland 
was Manchuria. For example famous anti-Manchu radical Zhang Binglin argued that 
Manchus should be banished from China to the Three Eastern Provinces, which they 
could have as an autonomous area. He furthermore assessed that Japanese were less 
foreign to Chinese than Manchus since they had similar script and habits. Shao Dan 
reveals that according to evidence unearthed recently by Chinese and Japanese scholars, 
Sun Yat-sen had even a secret plan to lease Manchuria to Japan.111 However, as the 
Russian and Japanese presence in Manchuria increased, public opinion in China Proper 
gradually turned against regarding Manchuria as a separate area. By 1930’s the 
universal sentiment was that Manchuria had actually been an integral part of China for 
centuries, and the founding of Manchukuo was a dire offence against Chinese 
sovereignty. This shift in opinion was admittedly supported by the increasing preference 
to regard China itself, originally an Western idea, as a larger area equivalent to Qing 
Empire rather than the earlier concept of Middle Kingdom, which encompassed only the 
innermost provinces where Han Chinese civilization purpotedly developed. The 
resulting ”Reconceptualization of the Manchuria-China Relationship” 112 , concept 
devised by Shao Dan, produced an international conflict which the League of Nations 
(LN) aspired to solve in order to maintain peace in the Far East. LN appointed a 
commission led by Victor Bulwer-Lytton, the 2nd Earl of Lytton, to research the causes 
of the Mukden Incident. The Lytton Commission spent six weeks in Manchuria during 
spring 1932 and released an account of the situation in Manchuria based on 
eyewitnesses’ reports and personal observations. However, the results of the committee 
satisfied neither the Japanese nor the Chinese. According to the committee, Chinese 
were faulty of anti-Japanese propaganda while Japanese had taken part in aggressive 
actions. In spite of such an attempt to preserve impartiality, the Lytton Committee, in 
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Daily Telegraph’s correspondent’s words, ”insists on the withdrawal of Japanese troops 
within the South Manchuria railway zone, and recommends the establishment of an 
organisation under the sovereignty of China to deal with conditions in Manchuria, 
taking due account of the rights and interests of Japan, and the formation of a committee 
of negotiation for the application of these and other recommendations.”113 In light of the 
Lytton Committee’s conclusion and international agreements, the League of Nations 
condemned Japanese aggression in Manchuria, which resulted in Japan withdrawing 
from the league in 1933. The League of Nations, however, had little actual influence in 
the Manchukuo issue, and the event rather presents an example of LN’s inability to 
enforce its decisions. European states were more concerned about their own problems at 
the eve of the Second World War, and United States, which was not even a member-
state to LN, invoked its non-interventionist policy. Neither did the lack of a major 
spontaneous independence movement free of Japanese influence in Manchuria prevent 
other foreign nations from recognizing Manchukuo’s sovereignty de jure, or tie trade 
relations with it and therefore recognize it de facto. It rather appears that Manchukuo’s 
foreign relations paralleled those of Japan. Especially after the beginning of WWII, 
states that officially recognized Manchukuo were either influenced or controlled by 
Japan or Germany. On the other hand, states that did not officially recognize 
Manchukuo had tense relations with Japan and their economic interests in Manchukuo 
were threatened by the strong Japanese presence in the area and the bilateral agreements 
between Manchukuo and Japan.  
 
The Lytton Committee’s report inspired the publication of a host of commentaries 
written by parties who saw themselves better fit to voice informed opinions about the 
Manchukuo issue than the members of the Lytton Committee who only spent a few 
weeks in the freshly founded state. Chokiuro Kadono remarked in his leaflet A 
Businessman’s View of the Lytton Report that the Lytton committee lacked profound 
understanding of the actual situation in Manchukuo, and that Japan has been the key 
player in maintaining peace and progress in Manchuria for decades. Furthermore, he 
argues, sovereignty has always been passed in China from dynasty to another ”at the 
point of the sword”.114 A document titled The Japanese Government’s Statement of 
Observations on Lytton Report insists that the Lytton Committee downplayed Japanese 
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sources and overestimated the genuineness of dubious Chinese sources. The report 
further continues that, unlike the Lytton Committee claims, there was a local 
”Manchuria for Manchurians” independence movement before the Manchukuo period. 
In addition, the report highlights the restoration movement for re-founding the Qing 
Dynasty. ”There can be no doubt that the idea of proclaiming independence, which had 
also a certain affinity with the idea of restoring the Manchu Dynasty, had its origin, 
therefore, entirely among the Chinese, Manchus and Mongols.”115 George Bronson Rea 
concludes that there is no proof of Manchus’ extinction, and therefore the Chinese claim 
over the Manchus’ homeland is injust116. Harry Hussey offers an opposite view in his 
booklet Manchukuo in relation to world peace – things not told in the report of the 
commission enquiry. According to Hussey, Manchus themselves worked actively for 
incorporating Manchuria as an integral part of China. The Chinese had been habiting 
South-Manchuria for two millenias while Manchus had sinicizated and did not differ 
from Han Chinese in any relevant aspect. Hussey concludes that Manchus consider 
themselves Chinese and are loyal to the present government of China.117 All things 
considered, the Japanese attempt at legalizing the state of Manchukuo, by maintaining 
that it was a product of Manchus’ ethnic realization of the need for their own nation 
state, was based on flimsy footing, and they renounced such argument soon after 
establishing Manchukuo. The evident conflict between the ”Harmony between the five 
races” and Manchukuo as Manchus’ nation-state was presumably the result of 
contemporary understanding that nation-states were the natural unit in which people 
should be distributed, and that in order to legitimize the Manchukuo state it too had to 
comply with such idea. However, such endeavour was quite impossible since in many 
parts of Asia, ethnic groups were intermingled in a fashion that made constructing 
borders between them unfeasible. 118  The argument that there was no independence 
movement in Manchuria to begin with is likewise an exaggeration. As Mitter points out, 
levels of both resistance and support for the new state and Japanese occupation have 
been dramatized in popular memory119. Japanese occupation of Manchuria set off a 
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powerful resistance movement in China Proper, but local elites in Manchukuo were 
keen to collaborate instead120.  
 
In retrospect, what is more relevant today than Manchukuo’s actual level of sovereignty 
is how the persistent narrative that Manchukuo was a puppet state has influenced the 
historiographies on the subject. The concept of puppet state includes hidden 
presumptions, many of which are more or less unsound in the case of Manchukuo, such 
as that local leaders did not have any power and that Manchukuo was merely one of 
Japan’s colonies, founded with coercion and aggression. Regardless of how 
Manchukuo’s sovereignty is perceived, it was habited by millions of Manchus of whom 
not much is known about. The following chapter endeavours to relate a general 
overview of these Manchus. 
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3.2. Manchus in Manchukuo 
 
Demographics on Manchus in Manchukuo are extremely unreliable. H.E.M. James 
reported already in 1888 that “Manchus are now a rarity in their own country”. 
According to James, Manchus were to be found at all garrison towns, in the 
neighbourhood of Manchu magistrates and in the remote recesses of the mountains.121 
Although the number of Manchus was dwindling in comparison to the thriving Han 
Chinese population, Manchus were hardly extinct. According to Japanese sources cited 
by Shao Dan, there were about 5,65 million Manchus in Manchukuo in 1935, 4,63 
million in 1936 and 4,35 million in 1937122 (see appendix D, page 84). According to 
Chinese sources referred to by Thomas Scharping, by 1940 there were only 2,56 million 
Manchus combined in Manchuria and Northeastern Mongolia combined 123  (see 
appendix C, page 84). However, gathering any trustworthy information on the topic is 
extremely challenging. First of all, in order to legislate the Manchukuo state, Japanese 
officials saw it fit to exaggerate the number of Manchus especially in the beginning of 
the Manchukuo era, while Chinese, particularly during the PRC period, belittled the 
number, or did not take Manchus in Manchukuo into consideration. Secondly, there is 
no statistics on how many Manchus fled from China Proper to Manchuria and 
Manchukuo after the fall of the Qing Empire. Shao Dan remarks that the violence and 
discrimination Manchus faced in China Proper after 1911 did not cause a remarkable 
migration to Manchuria, and on that behalf Manchuria’s demographic structure 
apparently remained intact124. Thirdly, the Manchukuo period was perhaps the height of 
Manchu dispersion, therefore discussing them as one group is very problematic. As 
mentioned earlier, after the fall of the Qing Dynasty many Manchus took up Han 
Chinese identities, and it is quite impossible to know who were Han Chinese and who 
were ex-Manchus who had taken Han Chinese names but still possibly regarded 
themselves as Manchus. Furthermore, Japanese and Chinese officials used quite 
different methods to conduct census. Yet some references to Manchus are still to be 
found in contemporary sources. 
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As Shirokogoroff pointed out, the Chinese influence on Manchus was at its greatest in 
South Manchuria, and at its weakest in North Manchuria. In practice Manchu language 
was extinct except in small villages in North Manchukuo. Undoubtedly culture exhange 
in Manchukuo increased as the infrastructure expanded, but the small villages in North 
Manchuria remained, to a large extent, outside of Japanese influence. Shirokogoroff 
also reported that many Manchus in Manchuria, having lost their political influence, 
were actually in a quite confused state about what actually was part of indigenous 
Manchu culture and what was not. For example, as soon as the revolution broke out in 
1911, Manchus in Aigun district cut off their long plaits in protest, regarding it as a 
“Chinese fashion”. Likewise, these Manchus considered Confucianism as a purely 
Manchu idea.125 On the other hand, Manchus had forgotten some of their industries, 
such as pottery and metalwork, and had later read from Chinese books that these 
industries are actually Chinese inventions, and it did not occur to them to doubt such a 
proposition. 126  Situation in South Manchukuo was defined by closeness and 
intermingledness between different groups. British diplomat Sir Alexander Hosie noted 
in 1904 that there are few outward differences between Manchus and Han Chinese. 
Unlike Han Chinese, Manchu women did not have bound feet and wore distinctive 
coiffure and dress. However, Hosie could not distinguish Manchu and Han Chinese 
males.127 His view was undoubtedly shared by many contemporary Westerners who did 
not have profound understanding of the ethnic complexity in Northeast Asia. However, 
the prevalence of such a view has contributed to Manchus’ invisibility later in 
Manchukuo.  
 
Manchus in Manchukuo combined several religions and philosophies for their use. 
Shamanism is considered an indigenous Manchu religion to the extent that the word 
shaman is said to be the only loan word from Manchu that exists in English (in reality, 
however, the Manchu word saman was transferred to English via Russian, which 
explains the sibilant sh or š). Due to the cultural interaction between Han Chinese, 
Mongols and Manchus since early Manchu and Jurchen history, also Buddhism, 
Taoism, and finally Confucianism as the state ideology of the Qing were adopted.128 
However, it seems probable that during the Manchukuo period shamanism was mainly 
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practiced by the frontier Manchus who dwelled in rural areas. The flourishment of 
Shamanism was stunted already during the Qing Dynasty, when Qing ruling elite aimed 
at standardizing it. Buddhism, on the other hand, thrived both before and during the 
Manchukuo period.129  For example Puyi was a devoted Buddhist. His last wife Li 
Shuxian told in her memoirs in 1984 that ”I didn’t believe in Buddhism, but Puyi did. I 
knew that he had worshipped every day in the Imperial Palace, in Changchun, during 
the period of the Manchukuo.” 130  Besides canonized philosophies and religions, 
Manchus sported various folk beliefs, such as one should not eat dog meat or wear dog 
hides, because dog had an important status in Manchu mythologies. During the 
Manchukuo period, however, Japanese appointed Shintoism as the official state 
religion. Hundreds of Shinto temples were erected all around the country, and some 
Manchus in nominal leading positions, such as Puyi, were forced to pay their respects 
first in Shinto temples and only secondarily worship ancestors at the Qing tombs outside 
Mukden131. From 1940 onwards the Manchukuo government proclaimed that public 
participation in state Shinto rituals will be a civic duty for all132. On the other hand, 
fearing Soviet influence in the area, the Concordia Association held frequent 
anticommunism and anti-atheism rallies, which resulted also in appreciation of local 
religions such as Buddhism and Confucianism133 . In addition, many European and 
American missionaries roamed Manchukuo. For example Danish missionaries 
considered their work in Manchuria to be quite fruitful, but Japanese control over 
everything made things slightly more difficult for them. One Danish missionary stated 
anxiously in Mukden in 1929 that “Chinese need Christianity in order to fight against 
the three dangers: the black danger (opium), the red danger (Communists) and the 
yellow danger (Japanese)!” 134  Despite the official preference for Shintoism, the 
Manchukuo period was certainly more religiously multifaceted and liberal than the later 
PRC era. 
 
In the beginning of 20th century, government ordered the obligatory schooling language 
in Manchuria to be Manchu, but after the fall of the Qing Dynasty this policy was 
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reversed, and teaching Manchu language was strictly prohibited altogether.135 During 
the Manchukuo period, the situation improved slightly as education in Manchu was 
once again possible, but the availability of Manchu education rested solely on the 
private sponsorship of wealthier Manchus. Higher education conducted in Manchu 
language was non-existent.136 Majority of Manchus, if schooled, went to schools that 
operated in Chinese. During the Manchukuo period the portion of children going to 
elementary school almost tripled from 13,5% in 1933 to 47,3% in 1940, but only 2 to 5 
percent of these children advanced to middle school 137 . Andrew Hall, who has 
researched textbooks used in Manchukuo and the policy on Japanese language 
education, describes that education bureucracy in Manchukuo differed significantly 
from other Japanese colonies. Even before 1932, the SMRC applied a style of pedagogy 
considerably more modern than was prevalent in Japan. Individualism, critical thinking 
and creativity were promoted in teachers’ training. This direction remained vital during 
the Manchukuo period. The first director of the Manchukuo Education General Affairs 
and School Affairs division Kamimura Tetsuya voiced in 1932 that ”My hope is that 
education can be separated from propaganda, and become true education.” Hall argues 
that until 1937, the major tendency in Manchukuo’s education policy was gradualism, 
which emphasized the new state as an inheritor of Confucian values, martial tradition of 
the non-Han peoples of the north, and the long-standing friendship with Japan. 
According to gradualism, cultural assimilation was not enough to eliminate native 
identity. At the time the portion of Japanese language in education was relatively small. 
After 1937, however, gradualism was replaced by reform optimism. It supported the 
view that language has the power to change the person who learns it. Japanese officials 
in Manchukuo believed that learning Japanese was the most effective tool for 
cultivating loyalty among the subjected people. Japanese language was believed to have 
a sacred power, the so called kotodama (word spirit), that enabled Japanese words to 
play a role in the relationship between humans and spirits (kami). Learning Japanese, 
therefore, was deemend enough to civilize Manchurians and instill students with 
Japanese spirit. Belief in Japanese’s power resulted in textbooks having relatively little 
propagandistic content when compared to Korea and Taiwan, where Japanese educators 
had operated with significantly harsher methods. However, the decade of liberal 
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education policies came gradually to its end in 1943 and education increasingly began 
to resemble the Japanese education centered around the emperor.138 
 
Altough the role of Manchus was emphasized in Manchukuo’s state ideologies, in 
practice Japanese designated both Han Chinese and Manchus in Manchuria with the 
common term ”Manchurians”, and Manchus did not enjoy any special status in the 
society that would have derived from their ethnicity139. The hierarchical relationship 
between Manchus and Japanese is interestingly described in Michele Mason and Helen 
Lee’s book Reading colonial Japan, text, context and critique (2012). Mason and Lee 
support the view that Japanese tolerated Manchus, but considered them barbarian in 
their habits and in need of education. Mason and Lee analyzed a diary written during the 
Manchukuo period by a Japanese lady who hired a Manchu girl as a servant, as the role 
of a Japanese woman as a good wife and wise mother included also taking care of less 
fortunate locals. The diary was later published to Japanese audience and presents a good 
example of the propaganda that aimed at raising goodwill between Japanese and 
Manchurians in the name of the ”Harmony between the five races”. According to the 
diary, during her service period the Manchu girl Guiyu started to be ashamed of her 
Manchuness and began to turn into a Japanese. But as Mason and Lee point out, the 
reason behind this phenomenom is hardly the appeal of Japanese culture, but rather the 
class status associated with modern lifestyle. Striving to become a Japanese was 
probably a desire to elevate one’s class position and gain access to privileges. A similar 
story is recounted by Shao Dan; in Xinjing, a Manchurian orphan was adopted by a 
Japanese couple, received the Japanese name Emiko, and underwent decent Japanese 
education including skills such as social etiquette, handicrafts and other skills required 
of Japanese women. This story was likewise published in a newspaper to Japanese 
audience as ”a bright example of Manchurian-Japanese love, which crosses ethnic 
boundaries”. 140  Generally Manchus had antipathy towards Japanese, since their 
experience was that Japanese had always white rice to eat while many Manchus had to 
be content with coarse-grained sorghum or starvation.141 The phenomenon of elevating 
one’s status by changing one’s ethnic association is, as we have seen, a recurring event 
in the history of Manchus.  
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It can even be argued that Manchus, the name bearers of the new state, were the most 
unfortunate group in Manchukuo. Japanese occupiers were naturally the upper class 
with higher levels of education, income and positions. Koreans, on the other hand, were 
regarded as partly Japanized and therefore received slightly better treatment than local 
Manchurians. Mitter comments that the status of Koreans was interpreted flexibly by 
the Japanese; sometimes they were regarded as racially inferior, but at other times as 
citizens of the Japanese empire with the privileges that went along with that 
citizenship142. Han Chinese, who constituted the majority of residents in Manchukuo, 
benefited from Chinese (instead of Japanese or Manchu) being elected the national 
language. Japanese officials had to study Chinese, and Han Chinese had to be 
represented in high positions of government and business world. Furthermore, 
contributions were made to preserve Mongol heritage. The Manchukuo Government 
publicly emphasized the promotion of Mongol culture and uniqueness; a special 
administration for Mongols in Xing’an province, for example, surveyed Mongol 
customs and collected materials for writing Mongol history. Furthermore, Mongols’ 
educational opporturnities developed greatly under Japanese influence 143 . Nakami 
Tatsuo reports that primary education was ensured throughout the Mongol population, 
and provisions were granted for Mongol youths to enter institutions of higher education 
both in Manchukuo and Japan144. Mongols were even given judicial privileges, such as 
the right to hunt in forests. Soon after the establishment of the new state, Manchus were 
rarely mentioned. Perhaps there were fewer Manchus in Manchukuo than the Japanese 
expected, or possibly the Japanese occupiers could not differentiate between Manchus 
and Han Chinese. On the other hand, invigorating Manchu culture and activities would 
not have served Japanese political purposes.145 The difference between the treatment of 
Manchus and Mongols was undoubtedly partly explained by Japan’s fear of Soviet 
influence in Outer Mongolia. According to Nakami, Mongols believed that Japanese 
were there to help them, but in reality the Japanese did not have such goals in mind. 
Japanese presented themselves as revitalizers of the Mongols, but in reality nationalism 
in Mongolia was merely seen as a counterweight to China and Soviet Union. Regardless 
of actual intentions, Japanese presence in Manchukuo did influence Mongol 
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consciousness. Nakami further argues that on the other hand, acknowledging Mongol 
history gave Mongols confidence, and on the other hand, trying to limit Mongol 
nationalism led Mongols to resist the Japanese and therefore strengthen their Mongol 
identity.146 For Manchus, Manchukuo did not have such invigorating effect. 
 
3.2.1. Deprived peasants and ex-bannermen 
 
The life of frontier Manchus and Manchu ex-bannermen in Manchukuo was 
characterized by poverty caused by demolition of the clan properties during the Boxer 
Rebellion and other rampages that had taken place in the early 20th century, and the 
gradual cutting off the stipends in 1920’s. According to Collier and Malone, in 1936 the 
main occupations in Manchukuo were divided between agriculture (70%), industry 
(12%) and commerce (8%).147  It seems that Manchus in Manchukuo took part in a wide 
set of occupations, most of which, however, were quite plebeian in nature. Some 
frontier Manchus who had resided in Manchuria for a longer period of time had taken 
up agriculture as their livelihood already during the Qing Dynasty, since the meager 
stipends paid by the court were not enough to sustain them. Some Manchus, facing 
bankruptcy due to the fall of the Qing Dynasty, requested and received free farming 
land in faraway Manchurian locations from the ROC state in 1910’s and 1920’s; The 
Strait Times reported in 1915 that Manchus residing in Peking had signed a petition 
stating that their present means of livelihood are inadequate and requested that the 
president grant them waste land adjacent to the Imperial Mausolea in Liaoning and Jilin 
and also some undeveloped land in Huayuan and Chahar for tilling and cattle-rearing.148 
Many contemporary observations describe Manchus as less advanced in agriculture than 
their Han Chinese neighbours149, but these descriptions probably refer mainly to the 
latter group of Manchus who took up farming at a relatively late period.  
 
Besides agriculture, it seems probable that Japanese investments, which in their 
magnitude enraged even Japanese taxpayers themselves, reduced unemployment in 
Manchukuo, since construction works conducted all over the country required great 
volumes of manual labour. However, many sources report that while wages were higher 
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in Manchukuo than in China Proper, they were still exceedingly low. Furthermore, 
Japanese received twice as high pay as Manchus and Chinese, which naturally caused 
dissatisfaction. Malone and Collier remarked wittily in 1936 that in Europe machines 
are installed to save the cost of labour, but in Manchukuo men are used to save the cost 
of machines 150 . Construction work and continuously expanding infrastructure also 
resulted in increasing urbanisation, which allowed many unemployed Manchu 
bannermen and other destitute Manchus to work meager jobs in cities, for example as 
rickshaw pullers, porters, street vendors, water carriers, carriers of night soil, barbers, 
cobblers and even fortune tellers.151 Furthermore, especially during the latter part of 
Manchukuo, thousands of people were forced into labour152. There are, however, no 
trustworthy statistics on Manchus’ unemployment rates.  
  
Many contemporary observers noted that the three biggest social and domestic problems 
in Manchukuo were bandits, opium and epidemics153. These very same problems played 
also prominent roles in Manchus’ daily lives. Many were targeted by bandits or turned 
into banditry themselves, suffered from low hygiene that caused waves of epidemics, 
and were addicted to opium. Opium had been introduced to the area already during the 
Kangxi reign, and it became one of the top three agricultural products in the region by 
the end of the Qing Dynasty. Opium was sometimes banned, but without much result. 
During the Manchukuo period, Japanese saw intoxicants such as opium, heroin and 
morphine as an attractive source of revenue. For example doctor Morinaka, who worked 
at the Manchuria Medical College in Mukden, estimated in 1929 that about 25% to 50% 
of the prisoners in Manchuria’s jails were drug users.154  
 
There is dispute whether the level of banditry rose or fell during the Manchukuo period. 
On the other hand, safety in cities, where Japanese influence was at its greatest, rose, 
but the countryside saw relatively more banditry than before. Firstly, the Japanese 
occupation in 1931 disbanded many local armies, which produced unemployed soldiers 
that often turned into banditry. Secondly, many impoverished bannermen saw banditry 
as the only viable livelihood. Thirdly, also local farmers whose property was devastaded 
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by bandits turned into banditry themselves. Furthermore, banditry was an old custom in 
Manchuria. Japanese occupiers put substantial effort into extirpating the bandits, but 
according to some less reliable sources, they also sold weapons to bandits155. On the 
other hand, however, banditry had a very romantic image to many individual Japanese, 
and some ex-army officers even became famous as bandit chiefs. Officially Japanese 
called anybody who opposed them a bandit,156 and later during the PRC period these 
bandits that operated in Manchukuo were elevated to positions of national heroes for 
their anti-Japanese attitudes. In reality, however, it seems probable that banditry was 
motivated less by ideological and nationalistic purposes and more by practical questions 
of everyday livelihood. 
 
SMRC founded many hospitals and research laboratories that were utilized to reduce the 
amount of plagues. Furthermore, in some areas Japanese officials and police conducted 
hygiene campaigns, which everybody had to take part in. However, all Manchurians, 
including the local Manchus, faced the improbable but nevertheless real risk of being 
captured by the Japanese police for trifling reasons and being shipped to infamous 
Japanese research facilities all over Manchukuo, such as Unit 731 near Harbin, which 
conducted research on chemical and biological warfare. It is unlikely that any of the 
locals used as test animals survived. It is widely rumoured that some of the leading 
Japanese researchers who worked in these facilities were pardoned by United States in 
the aftermath of WWII in exchange for granting their research results exclusively to the 
USA. Some suspect that modern knowledge on phenomena such as hypothermia is 
based on this information. Furthermore, Harris speculates that due to careless sewage 
and waste transport, Japanese research facilities also spread diseases into the 
surrounding areas.157 
 
Regardless of the grave economical and social problems which existed in Manchukuo, 
majority of contemporary observers supported the view that the situation in Manchukuo 
was, nevertheless, much better than in China Proper. As Collier and Malone pointed 
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out, the soil was richer, salaries and standard of living higher, and the amount of 
epidemics was lower than in China Proper.158 
 
3.2.2. Dreamers of restoration 
 
The majority of Manchus who took part in Manchukuo on a political level were 
motivated by the wish to restore the Qing Dynasty and imperial era. These Qing-loyalist 
Manchus did not only include some members of the Aisin Gioro clan and other 
Manchus of high status, but also bannermen and, according to Shirokogoroff, local 
frontier Manchus likewise tended to dream about the restoration159. Unfortunately, there 
is not much information on the political activities of bannermen and frontier Manchus. 
Therefore, this chapter concentrates on the members of the Aisin Gioro clan who 
operated in Manchukuo. The most prominent among them include Puyi, his brother 
Pujie, their cousin Xianyu and the distant relative and direct descendant of Nurhaci’s 
brother Surhaci, Aisin Gioro Xiqia.  
 
Aisin Gioro Xiqia (1884-1950) was the only Manchu who is known to have served as a 
Minister in the Government of Manchukuo. He graduated from Japanese Military 
Academy in 1911, after which he led a creditable military career in Manchuria. Before 
becoming a Minister, he acted as Counselor for the Kwantung Army, Commander of the 
10th Brigade of Northeastern Army and Director of the Kirin Military School, to 
mention but a few of his titles. He was Manchukuo’s Finance Minister from 1932 to 
1934 and the Imperial Household Minister from from 1935 to 1945.160 There is very 
little research material on Xiqia; the information relayed here is based on an 
encyclopedia compiled by Kamesaka Tsunesaburo in 1943, Who is Who in Japan with 
Manchukuo and China 1941-1942. Xiqia is one of the few people who signed 
Manchukuo’s declaration of independence.161 Puyi recounted in his autobiography that 
Xiqia co-operated with Japanese officials in establishing Manchukuo since the 
beginning. Puyi reminisced his first arrival and reception in Xinjing, where Xiqia 
pointed out dragon flags between the Japanese ones and said that those who are holding 
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them are Manchu bannermen who have been waiting for Puyi ”to come home” for 
twenty years162.  
 
Aisin Gioro Xianyu (1906-1948), also known by her Chinese name Jin Bihui and her 
Japanese name Yoshiko Kawashima, nicknamed ”Manchukuo’s Joan of Arc”, has been 
presented by Shao Dan as an example of the grave identity crisis Manchus were victims 
of during the Manchukuo era163. Xianyu was adopted by his father’s friend Kawashima 
Naniwa when she was twelve years old. Xianyu inherited the Qing-restorationist ideas 
and was involved in the founding of Manchukuo in 1930’s. She helped the empress flee 
from Tientsin to Manchuria, participated in Japanese military actions in Jehol, and with 
the help of her royal Manchu background befriended many powerful and famous 
Japanese and Chinese figures. She was arrested and charged with treason by the ROC. 
The oral and written confessions left behind relate a complex ethnic and national 
identity – she felt she was a Japanese with Chinese blood, but most of all a Manchu 
banner person.164 
 
However, the matter of Manchukuo did not receive unanimous approval from all Aisin 
Gioros. Puyi’s little sister Puren recounted in a book ”The latter generations of the Aisin 
Gioros” that their father, Prince Chun, was quite against Manchukuo and the Japanese 
presence there. According to Puren, their father visited Puyi with her three siblings in 
Xinjing, and during the visit Japanese officials offered Prince Chun a high position in 
Manchukuo, were he to come over. Instead of consenting, Prince Chun hurried back to 
Beijing 165 . Also Li Shuxian pointed out later that Aisin Gioros rarely agreed on 
anything166. On the other hand, both of these two accounts were written in the PRC, 
which makes it quite impossible that such accounts would have any pro-Manchukuo 
sentiments.  
 
Likewise Aisin Gioros who at first had supported Manchukuo, soon saw that they had 
little influence in their new home. Japanese officials had explicit plans on how to 
manage affairs in Manchukuo, for example who would be the future emperor; Puyi was 
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repeatedly encouraged to take a Japanese wife, but since he refused, his brother Pujie 
finally consented. He married Saga Hiro in April 1937. Soon after, a law was passed 
which stated that in case the emperor did not have an heir, his brother or brother’s child 
could take the throne.167 The decision was especially sinister for the Aisin Gioros, since 
Puyi was known to be infertile, and the child of Pujie and Saga Hiro would have been 
considered Japanese.  
 
During the Manchukuo period, many Manchus in both lower and higher positions saw 
Manchukuo as a tool to redeem the Qing Dynasty and Manchus’ higher social status and 
quality of life associated with it. Japanese, with their advanced technology, were seen as 
a promising ally, since one of the reasons for Qing Dynasty’s demise had indeed been 
the reluctance to modernize their society. However, there seems to be little evidence 
that Manchus were content with Manchukuo only. Although the area was considered the 
home of their ancestors, Peking had been the crux of Manchu empire for centuries. 
Unfortunately only few Manchus had influence in Manchukuo and therefore resources 
to redeem Peking. Manchus’ position in Manchuria had declined for centuries and 
Japanese occupiers endeavoured to ensure local co-operation by maintaining the 
political situation that had existed in Manchuria before Manchukuo. Although Japanese 
occupiers aspired to legitimize the new state, this aspiration did not extend to replacing 
local Han Chinese power holders with Manchus, and this would indeed have been 
irrelevant, as Manchukuo was designed to be a multiethnic state from the beginning. 
Furthermore, Manchus’ wish to restore the Qing Dynasty and the Japanese dream of 
conquering Asia were naturally in direct conflict. In the beginning of the Manchukuo 
period the Japanese occupiers voiced ostensible sympathies towards Manchus’ wishes, 
but in reality they operated against realising such plans.   
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3.3. Brief glimpse to contemporary Manchus 
 
Once, when Premier Zhou Enlai invited Puyi, along with other chief guests, to a 
function, he introduced Puyi to the guests by saying, ”This is the Emperor Xuantong of 
the Qing Dynasty.” Puyi replied loudly, ”Now, I’m a citizen of the People’s Republic of 
China!” In front of everybody, Premier Zhou praised his wonderful answer! 
 Puyi’s last wife Li Shuxian, 1984168 
 
The state of Manchukuo perished at the same time when Japan conceded defeat to the 
Allied Forces in 1945. As was agreed at the Tehran Conference in November 1943 and 
the Yalta Conference in February 1945, Soviet Union began its Manchurian invasion on 
9th of August 1945, the same day as the atomic bombing of Nagasaki took place. After 
1945, Manchuria provided a base of operations for the People’s Liberation Army. 
Thereafter Soviet Union decided to hand over the area to newly founded People’s 
Republic of China as a sign of goodwill between two communist nations. After the 
collapse of Manchukuo, Manchus who had co-operated with Japanese were prosecuted 
and either executed or sent into re-education camps. Some famous examples included 
Aisin Gioro Xianyu, who was condemned a traitor and received death penalty in 1948, 
and Aisin Gioro Puyi, who was sent into a sanatorium in Siberia in 1945 with his 
brother Pujie. He was repatriated to China in 1949, spent nine years in Fushun War 
Criminals Management Centre in Liaoning, and was finally declared “reformed” in 
1959 and sent to Peking.169 However, the Manchukuo period and its end had little 
impact on the frontier Manchus who dwelled in rural locations. An elderly Manchu 
woman interwieved by Shao Dan in Sanjiazi (Heilongjiang) in 2000 recalled that she 
got married after the “Incident”, but could not relate what the “Incident” actually meant. 
She knew that the Japanese had come to Manchuria, but she had never actually seen any 
Japanese soldiers. She recounted that outside influence did not reach their village until 
the PRC period, probably during the Cultural Revolution, when the use of Manchu 
language was forbidden.170  
 
According to Janhunen, Manchu language is on the verge of irreversible extinction. 
Speakers of Manchu exist today only in four locations: the villages of Siji and 
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Dawujiazi in Heihe region (Aihui), the village of Daxing in Tailai County, the village of 
Sanjiazi in Fuyu county and among the diaspora population of Sibe in Xinjiang, which 
is now classified as a separate minority language.171 The foundation for this unfortunate 
situation was laid already during the Qing Dynasty, when the Qing ruling elite failed to 
sustain the territorial integrity of the Manchu-speaking rural population that still 
inhabited some parts of Manchuria until the late Qing. Furthermore, ethnicity in the 
PRC is mainly a titular position given by the administrative authorities; due to the 
bureaucratic nature of regulating ethnicities, less attention is paid to the rate of retaining 
native languages as an ethnic indicator. Today Manchus, with population of about 10 
million, are the third largest ethnic group in China, but according to Janhunen, this has 
little to do with any “true revigoration of the Manchu nationality, let alone its 
language.”172 In addition, especially Manchu males are ridden with alcoholism and the 
accidents, murders and suicides that go with it. This has caused a further decline in their 
position. 173  Manchus are also relatively less educated than other ethnicities in 
Manchuria today. According to statistics collected by Scharping, in 1990 approximately 
1% of Manchus in Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang have graduated from university, 
7,7% from Senior High, 27,3% from Junior High and 38,7% from Elementary 
School.174 
 
However, some researchers hold a more positive view on the Manchu situation. In his 
lecture “Reinventing the Manchus” Mark Elliot points out the Manchus’ paradoxical 
survival; how Manchus, earlier presumed to be sooner or later swallowed up by the Han 
Chinese majority, still survive today in such a large number. Undoubtedly, many 
registered themselves as Manchu especially since the 1980’s when the political climate 
was tolerant enough, and the incentives granted for ethnic minorities, such as omission 
from the one-child policy and better chances at entering a university, were attractive 
enough. Furthermore, registering oneself as a Manchu is relatively effortless since one 
does not have to comply with Stalinist description of “minority nationality” that the 
PRC originally followed; in other words territory, language, economy and ethnic self-
consiousness. Instead proving banner identity or banner ancestry was relatively easy.175 
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There is little research information on how many Manchus re-registered for the 
advantageous policies and how many according to their true ethnic identity. It is certain 
that the majority of modern Manchus are descended from Han bannermen or the 
Hanjun. As Elliot commented the phenomenom, since 1980’s “it was cool to be a 
national minority again.”176  
 
Elliot’s statement is supported by many other researchers and reports. Scharping pointed 
out in his 1998 article that scholarly interest towards Manchu language rose greatly 
since the 1980’s in China especially among the Manchus. In 1981 80 scholars met in 
Shuangcheng county in Heilongjiang in order to study the Manchu language.177 At the 
time only nine of them had good command of the language. Since then, many journals, 
research institutes and conferences have been founded in order to study Manchu 
language and culture. 178  For example, in the PRC the Society for Manchu Studies 
(Manzuxue yanjiu, 满族学研究) publishes a bimonthly journal of the same name. 
Manchu Association of Taipei, which brings together individuals of Manchu descent, 
was founded in 1981.179 The popularity of Manchus has also risen among the common 
populace. The Baltimore Sun reported in 1995 that Manchu culture is making a 
comeback in a more tolerant China. In his interview, Zhao Zhan, a researcher at the 
Central University of Nationalities, says “My Manchu friends have started to ask me to 
give their children Manchu names … Many others have re-registered as Manchu and no 
longer pretend that they are Chinese.” A Manchu entrepreneur Bao Shiyi, an owner of a 
Manchu teahouse and a Manchu gift shop in the Forbidden City, says “Privately, I think 
the ten emperors of the Qing were versatile, capable, honest and clean. They conquered 
so much territory for China, like Tibet and Xinjiang … Our emperors were better than 
the other dynasties’”.180  It seems also that the increased scholarly attention paid to 
Manchus has increased their own awareness of the value of Manchu language and 
culture. New York Times reported in 2007 that only about 18 of the villagers in Sanjiazi 
speak Manchu, and most of them generally use Chinese both at home and outside. Meng 
Shujiang, at that time an 82-year-old widow, was determined to teach her grandson 
Manchu language and culture. In the New York Times interview, she says: “I don’t even 
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know if I have tomorrow, but I will use the time to teach my grandchildren … It is our 
language; how can we let it die? We are the Manchu people.”181 However, it seems that 
Manchus who now reside in the PRC prefer not to discuss the Manchukuo issue, or 
consider it a mistake or a disappointment.  
 
The first Manchu autonomous county was established in Xinbin in Northeast China in 
1985. Since then, multiple Manchu autonomous counties have been approved by the 
PRC state.182 The foundation of autonomous Manchu areas took place relatively late on 
a comparatively small level. Majority of Manchus reside in Beijing, and naturally it is 
not possible to transform the capital into an autonomous zone.183 However, the majority 
of the populace even in the Manchu autonomous counties is Han Chinese, and therefore, 
as Janhunen argues, the so-called autonomous zones do not offer a proper environment 
to increase minorities’ linguistic and ethnic independence through isolation.184 On the 
other hand, legislation requires that autonomous counties reserved for certain ethnic 
minorities have to have a member of that ethnic minority in their municipal 
governments. Therefore granting the status of an autonomous county has at least some 
practical meaning.  
 
One of the interesting peculiarities of the post-Qing Manchus’ history is that Manchus, 
albeit the Qing Dynasty fell in 1912 and was never to be redeemed, have until today 
been emblems of the past imperialism and feudalism. Manchus’ treatment has 
oftentimes depended on how each regime and government has regarded the Qing era 
itself. During the 1950’s and 1980’s a more tolerant period resulted in increases in 
Manchu population, while the 1960’s Cultural Revolution respectively saw a decline in 
Manchu numbers. The turbulent change in demographics is by no means dependent 
only on natural causes, but the amount of Manchus has always rather depended on 
whether or not it is beneficial to be a Manchu. Both Japanese occupiers in Manchukuo 
and the PRC politicians have tried to make use of the Manchus’ imperial origins. The 
Japanese had Puyi play the role of the Manchu emperor of Manchukuo in order to 
ensure the cooperation of the Qing-loyalists and legislate the new state by appealing to 
Manchus’ imperial origins and right for their ancient homeland. The PRC government 
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and its representatives, as the quote from Zhou Enlai in the beginning of this chapter 
demonstrates, had Puyi present himself as a reformed citizen in order to illustrate the 
benevolence of the new communist state to other Manchus and Qing-loyalists. Li 
Shuxian tells in her memories that Zhou Enlai encouraged Puyi to not only avoid being 
influenced by Qing-loyalists, but also to “help them with their ideological 
remoulding”185. Puyi has indeed been a puppet for his whole life, and his case rather 
aptly represents Manchus’ inability to reorganize and revitalize their actions after the 
Qing Dynasty.  
 
 
185 Wang & Li, 2011 (2008, 1984), p. 118.  
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4. Manchus and the conceptual problemacy 
 
 
A consensus is growing among some scholars that even if the Manchus were 
acculturated and ruled in part as Chinese, there always remained something palpably 
”different” about them, or at least the perception of something different. The problem 
is, of course, how to define that ”something.”  
Mark C. Elliot, 2001.186  
 
This chapter analyzes the conceptual problemacy that surrounds Manchus. Latest 
scholarly debate which has taken place in some selected works written by the most 
prominent representatives of the New Qing School, such as Pamela Kyle Crossley and 
Mark C. Elliot, has been endeavoured to be taken into consideration. Since 1990’s 
concepts such as sinicization, ethnic group and ethnicity have generated multiple 
fascinating arguments that differ considerably from earlier attitudes. As Elliot describes 
the situation, late 20th century intellectual climate has encouraged scholars to question 
the earlier hegemonized histories187. Crossley goes even further in her pointed remark 
on the pre-1990’s scholarship on Manchus as ”hopelessly vague and unapologetically 
stamped with the prejudices and assumptions of Chinese nationalist scholarship.”188 
Furthermore, one can not understate how ambigous the concept of ”Manchu” itself is. 
Several scholars have attempted to reach a conclusion on who Manchus actually were. 
This Master’s Thesis focuses especially on the concepts used in English literature; 
considering Chinese terms such as shaoshuminzu (少数民族) among others would 
demand yet another Master’s Thesis; as Crossley points out, shaoshuminzu is often 
considered to be synonymous with the term ”ethnic minority”, but such 
conclusion ”leaves us dissatisfied with our ability to be precise about China's social and 
cultural experience”.189  In any case, shaoshuminzu is a modern concept used on an 
administrative basis today and is therefore not relevant in the case of Manchus in 
Manchukuo. 
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4.1. Criticism on sinicization 
 
The concept of sinicization has been a persistent tendency in research on Manchus until 
1990’s and is still used by many scholars without due criticism. Pei Huang recognizes 
two phases of sinicization in the Manchu history. The first was the pre-conquest phase 
of Jurchens’ contact with Han Chinese in Liaodong through geographical, economic, 
political and social channels. The second was the conquest phase during which contact 
with Han Chinese became easier, broader and deeper than before.190 Janhunen remarks 
that surrounding ethnicities have always tended to be assimilated by the Han Chinese 
center191, and this is certainly true in many respects. As Elliot points out, Chinese 
civilization has fascinated all those who have encountered it. All the major cultures in 
East Asia have been influenced by the Chinese. During the Qing Dynasty, Manchus 
adopted the framework for the government from the earlier Ming Dynasty, and spoke 
and wrote Chinese better than Manchu.192 Until the end of the Manchukuo period, the 
rural areas in Heilongjiang were perhaps the most succesful in avoiding the clutches of 
sinicization, but altogether Manchus who dwelled in larger cities and in South 
Manchukuo did not seemingly differ much from their Han Chinese neigbours. The 
Kwantung Army and the SMRC did not adopt such strong Japanization measures as 
Japanese occupiers had done in Korea and Taiwan, and therefore the cultural situation 
in Manchukuo was, to a great extenct, a continuation of the earlier regimes of Zhang 
Zuolin and Zhang Xueliang. The assumption that Chinese have always assimilated their 
Inner Asian conquerors simply by their extended residence in China is the basic idea 
that the so called Sinicization School supports. However, this argument does more to 
obscure than to illuminate the complex nature of acculturation.193  
 
Elliot argues that the basis for sinocentric support for sinicization lies in the 
ethnocentric assumptions of the unparalled values that defined the Chinese people and, 
therefore, civilization itself. The division between Chinese and barbarians was outlined 
by Chinese scholars already before the Qin Dynasty. This ideology survived until the 
Qing Dynasty.194  A document from the Taiping Rebellion period states: “We have 
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carefully investigated the Manchus’ Tartar origins and have found that their first 
ancestor was a crossbreed of a white fox and a red dog, from whom sprang this race of 
demons.”195 According to some Han Chinese during the ROC period, the Manchus’ 
barbarian origins offered a reason for their failure to defend the dynasty from Western 
imperialism. However, this narrative of barbarianism did not offer a satisfactory 
explanation on why Manchus succeeded in ruling China for such a long time. The 
narrative of sinicization, on the other hand, explained that Manchus ruled China for 260 
years only thanks to the sinicization process; in other words, a civilization process. The 
amalgamation of the narratives of barbarianism and sinicization bears contradictions 
that tell more about the historians and revolutionists themselves than Manchus. As 
Elliot described the early 20th century situation, due to the sinicization model “the 
shameful fact of China’s long domination by so-called foreigners was thereby solved, 
and the Manchu conquest of China neatly reinterpreted as the Chinese conquest of the 
Manchus.”196 This further fuelled, as discussed before, the notion of Manchuria being 
annexed to China by Manchus rather than China being annexed to the Manchu dynasty.  
 
Western researchers have likewise adopted the narrative of sinicization. This is partly 
the result of a focus on Chinese-language material and the neglect of Manchu-language 
material. The criticism of sinicization gained momentum only when the archives on the 
issue were made public in 1980’s. Elliot, who has made use of these archives, reports 
that Manchu-language documents compose approximately one fifth of the Qing 
archives, most of which are stored in the First Historical Archives in Beijing, totalling 
about 2 million articles. Earlier scholars assumed that all Qing government 
documentation was produced simultaneously in Chinese and in Manchu, and therefore 
reading the Chinese version was deemed sufficient. Only three decades ago it was 
discovered that some Manchu versions are complete while Chinese versions had been 
censored.197 Furthermore, according to Crossley, Manchu language retained its military 
value as a secret code for communication between the court and the field even at the 
brink of the language’s extinction198. Therefore the discovery of the existence of unique 
Manchu language documents is altogether quite expectable199. 
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The insistence on sinicization has fundamentally shaped the research on Manchus until 
today. However, as Elliot argues, one has to consider what such hegemonized history 
has left untold. Granted that Manchus were acculturated, they were never assimilated 
into the Chinese society during the Qing Dynasty. First of all, adopting Chinese 
institutions did not mean becoming Chinese, and a shift in one’s cultural practices does 
not necessarily mean a shift in one’s self-perception. Secondly, the concept of 
sinicization obscures what “Chinese” has meant through centuries. Furthermore, also 
Han Chinese were “Manchuicized”. Acculturation was by no means a one-way street; 
for example the Peking dialect of Mandarin Chinese still bears some characteristics lent 
from Manchu language. Thirdly, the sinicization process does not explain how 
Manchus, a minority in the face of the staggering Han Chinese majority, managed to 
rule China for such a long period of time.200 Furthermore, as Elliot argues, the notion of 
Manchus having assimilated and lost their indigenous identity implies the existence of 
an objective, unchanging standard of “Manchuness”201. As discussed in chapter 2.1., the 
Manchu ruling elite did try to create such a uniform definition and apply it in practice, 
but this was mainly a fruitless effort. Secondly, Elliot continues, the concept of 
sinicization creates an equation between cultural performance and ethnic self-
identification, and implies the false dichotomy that one should be either a Manchu or a 
Chinese202. However, as we have seen throughout the course of this Master’s Thesis, the 
boundaries between Manchus and other groups has never been so rigid. During the Qing 
Dynasty and in today’s PRC, many Han Chinese have furthered their social standing by 
joining the ranks of Manchus. Likewise, after the Qing Dynasty and during the 
upheavals of Cultural Revolution, Manchus aspired to elevate their position by 
becoming Han Chinese, Mongols or, as in the case of Manchukuo, even Japanese.  
 
 
4.2. Ethnic group or ethnicity? 
 
The concepts of “ethnic group” and “ethnicity” are oftentimes used as synonyms, but in 
order to clarify the development of anthropological history these concepts are separated. 
In this Master’s Thesis, the concept of “ethnic group” denotes the static and traditional 
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impression that prevailed in research especially before 1970’s and according to which 
an ethnic group is defined by a collective language, culture and geographical location. 
The concept of sinicization is essentially based on such static composition of ethnic 
groups. The concept of “ethnicity”, on the other hand, implies the modern 
understanding that highlights the importance of individuals’ self-perception as the 
foundation for ethnicity, rather than any external characteristics shared by a certain 
group of people.  
 
Traditionally ethnic groups are defined as having shared beliefs, values, habits, customs 
and norms, and a common language, religion, history, geography or kinship. Ethnic 
groups oftentimes have a collective name, belief in common descent and a sense of 
solidarity; first and foremost, the members of an ethnic group have similar features, 
while at least some features between that ethnic group and others are dissimilar. The 
argument for sinicization is fundamentally based on such static version of ethnic 
groups’ characteristics.  
 
Some Manchus certainly have some of the aforementioned qualities, the name 
“Manchu” at the very least. Rhoads argues that the so-called pre-conquest Old Manchus 
had the racial, linguistic, and cultural homogeneity of an ethnic group, but later New 
Manchus who had arranged into banners constituted a multiethnic corporation that had 
ceased to be such a uniform group of people203. Especially Jurchens who predated and 
later created Manchus can be considered an ethnic group in a traditional sense, but 
generally speaking defining Manchus themselves as an ethnic group is indeed very 
problematic. During the Qing Dynasty those who considered themselves Manchus were 
a large and widely scattered group of people who excelled in adjusting to different 
environments and integrating into cultures that prevailed in their location. Conditions 
varied from garrison to garrison, but in general Manchu bannermen learned to speak 
local dialects, adopted local values and appreciated local history204. In the first place, 
Manchus were an invention devised by Hong Taiji and other members of the ruling 
elite, created in order to unify a miscellaneous set of clans, tribes and ethnicities under a 
single name. Elliot argues, however, that inventing an ethnic group is itself not 
testimony against its indigenousness, but rather a practice that is more common than is 
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generally acknowledged205. Nevertheless, the core problem is that Manchus commenced 
to conquer the Ming Dynasty long before they would have naturally arranged into a 
single ethnic group. Instead, since the founding of the Eight Banners, Manchus were a 
heterogenous, culturally and linguistically disunited people. Regardless of the effort the 
Qing ruling elite invested in creating a unified Manchu culture and history that all 
Manchus should imbibe, the results were decidedly poor as Manchus all over China and 
Manchuria carried on having their own ideas of what being a Manchu meant. During the 
Qing Dynasty in China Proper, being a Manchu had, most of all, certain royal symbolic 
value, and it ensured meager governmental stipends that composed the main source of 
livelihood for many impoverished Manchus.  
 
Pamela Kyle Crossley has solved the problem by pointing out that all Manchus, despite 
their heterogeneity and the so-called sinicization or acculturation, share the same ethnic 
identity and therefore form an ethnicity206. This line of thought is based on Fredrik 
Barth’s definition of ethnicity. According to Barth, ethnicity exists when a group of 
people claim a certain ethnic identity for themselves and are defined by others as having 
that identity. According to Barth’s boundary maintenance theory, it is not important 
who ethnicities include, but how it is determined whom they include and exclude.207 
Also Richard Ashmore et al. points out that of all the dimensions that constitute an 
ethnic identity, self-categorization is the most significant. Measurement of ethnic 
identity, according to Ashmore and others, must always begin with verifying that the 
individuals being studied do in fact self-identify as members of a particular group208. 
Rigger further emphasizes that Manchus, like many other communities that have been 
labeled an ethnic group, cannot be assigned a consistent and unitary history or 
identity.209 Moreover, Phinney and Ong argue that for clarity, ethnic behaviour, such as 
language, should be considered separate from ethnic identity.210 Therefore for example 
language retaining rate does not directly correlate with the prosperity, or lack thereof, of 
Manchu society.  
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However, Crossley and Elliot disagree on how and when Manchus actually constituted 
an ethnicity. Crossley, who Elliot calls a revisionist, argues that Manchus reached a 
sense of ethnicity only after 19th century when Manchus began to confront ethnic 
tensions during the Taiping Rebellion, Opium Wars and finally the Republican 
Revolution in 1911-1912 and its aftermath. Originally Manchu ethnic identity was 
weak, but gradually strengthened over time in spite of acculturation. 211 In other words, 
the dissipation of the Old Manchus as an ethnic group, as described by Rhoads, and the 
flourishment of the New Manchus as an ethnicity happened gradually and 
simultaneously, and these two occurences were not in actual conflict. Elliot, nominating 
himself a neotraditionalist, objects and asserts that Manchu ethnicity did exist already 
before the 19th century; founding and maintaining the Qing Empire, according to Elliot, 
was based essentially on ethnic separation between Manchus and Han Chinese. 212 
However, Crossley and Elliot agree on Manchus’ difference having mattered throughout 
the Qing Dynasty, and Manchus never having assimilated or absorbed by the Han 
Chinese majority213. 
 
In summary, the main difference between an ethnic group and an ethnicity is that 
members of an ethnic group share certain characteristics that also separate them from 
other groups, while ethnicity is a broader idea of belonging to a certain group that can 
be also very heterogenous. However, ethnic identity is generally considered to be 
something that develops through time and can not be totally disregarded or changed on 
a whim. Yet since the invention of the name ”Manchu”, Manchus have gone through 
phases of inclusion and exclusion that do not necessarily depend on one’s identity. 
These exclusion and inclusion policies were administered by whichever government 
was ruling at the time. In the 16th and early 17th centuries, the Qing ruling elite decreed 
that Manchus were an inclusive group to which one could enter by joining the banners; 
all bannermen and those loyal to the Aisin Gioros were considered Manchus. This 
policy enlarged the Manchu armed forces greatly during the conquest of the Ming 
Dynasty. However, in the 17th and 18th centuries during the Kangxi and Qianlong 
reigns this policy was changed into exclusiveness; in order to be a Manchu, one had to 
prove his ancestry back to the Jianzhou Federation. This function was aimed at 
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homogenizing the Manchu population. Uplifting one’s social status by becoming a 
Manchu, however, was still possible by intermarriage, which allowed especially many 
Han Chinese women to influence their Manchu children culturally and linguistically. 
For example, although the emperor was expected to marry a Manchu lady, it was 
acceptable to have Han Chinese concubines, and the mothers of many Manchu 
emperors were in fact Han Chinese. After the Qing Dynasty, however, Manchus were 
persecuted and many decided to take Chinese identities. Manchus being treated symbols 
of the imperial and feudal era induced certain kind of treatment; the PRC government 
regarded Manchus wearily at first, and did not grant them the status of an ethnic 
minority in the first 1949 CPC meeting, and neither were Manchus present there. 
However, the status was granted in the 1952 meeting when CPC arrived to a resolution 
that Manchus had a fairly strong ethnic sense. As a result, the population of Manchus 
rose greatly214. However, during the Cultural Revolution Manchus were persecuted once 
again. The situation did not greatly improve before the more open atmosphere of the 
1980’s, when the status of Manchus rose once again; Zhou Enlai’s remark on the 
importance of Manchus in Chinese history and the correlation between the Qing state 
and PRC made Manchus feel proud of their Manchuness once more.215 The rotation of 
these disadvantageous and beneficial periods has therefore had a substantial effect on 
Manchu population and its structure. Since the fall of the Qing Dynasty, the amount of 
Manchus has, therefore, depended on the one hand on how beneficial or 
disadvantageous it is to be a Manchu, and on the other hand, how ethnicities were 
defined by the ruling government or hegemon, whether it was the government of the 
ROC, Manchukuo or PRC, or the Japanese occupiers in Manchuria.  
 
4.3. An institution? 
 
 
On the whole, discussion on ethnic groups and ethnicities has spurred the publication of 
innumerable debates, and it is not possible to expound each of them here. Instead, this 
Master’s Thesis pursues to create a new viewpoint to enlighten the complexity of 
Manchus’ organization. I argue that the concept of institution brings forward some 
aspects to Manchus that concepts of sinicization, ethnic group or even ethnicity fail to 
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take into account sufficiently. Two institution theories introduced by Sasada Hironori 
are applied: the power-based rationalist theory and the collective action theory216.  
 
According to the power-based rationalist theory devised by Jack Knight, institutions are 
formed by political leaders who attempt to create strategic advantages with relation to 
other actors217. Knight supports the view that in order to rational actors to take part in 
creating institutions, self-serving benefits must exceed the costs of doing so218. Sasada 
further summarizes the power-based rationalist theory as thus: ”Institutional 
arrangements reflect the power balance among actors. Powerful actors build institutions 
to secure or further increase their power. The institutions continue to exist as long as the 
given power structure remains unchanged.”219 According to the collective action theory 
by Barry Weingast, actors build institutions to achieve mutually beneficial outcomes220. 
Institutions enforce exchange and cooperation that is in the interests of the actors 
involved. Sasada outlines the collective action theory as follows: ”Actors build 
institutions to overcome collective action problems and achieve mutual benefits. The 
institutions continue to exist as long as they perform such function and advance actor 
interests.”221 
 
Manchus, in this sense, bear the very characteristics of an institution. In accordance with 
the power-based rationalist theory, Nurhaci and his heir Hong Taiji founded the Manchu 
institution in order to consolidate and increase their power, and create strategic 
advantages against the Ming Empire. As mentioned before, Nurhaci created the Eight 
Banners, the new basis for Manchu organization that replaced the original Manchu clan 
organization, and appointed his relatives to lead these banners. In other words, certain 
political situation produced formation of ethnic and social relations rather than the other 
way around. Later Aisin Gioros created the mythology in which they had a central place 
among Manchus. Aisin Gioros continued the effort to build and strengthen their 
institution by devising a collective Manchu culture, although this project was, to a large 
extent, a failure. As Christiaan Klieger points out, Manchus remained a political cadre 
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rather than a culture-and-language-based ethnic group until the end of the Qing 
Dynasty 222 . In addition, the rise of Confucianism replaced the original Manchu 
autocracy, and decision-making was centralized to fewer people than before. Most 
important of all, the qualifications for being and becoming a Manchu were decided by 
the Qing ruling elite. During the 17th century Manchus were an inclusive group whose 
membership anyone loyal to Aisin Gioros could attain. Later, the Qing ruling elite 
decided that more emphasis should be put on ancestry, and therefore Manchus became 
an exclusive and smaller group of people. This smaller group, however, continued not to 
have unified culture; for example the portion of those Manchus able to speak Manchu 
language continued to dwindle.  
 
As mentioned before, Elliot argues that in order to ensure their secure grip of China 
Proper, Manchus did not only need to adopt the Confucian traditions from earlier Ming 
Dynasty in order to legitimise their rule, but also maintain the segregation between 
conquering minority over conquered majority. Elliot continues that similar means of 
control through ethnic differentiation have been used by numerous other groups such as 
Normans in England, Mongols in Russia, British in India, Turks in Byzantium and 
Afrikaners in South Africa.223 Therefore the ethnic uniformity of Manchus did not only 
have symbolic value but also practical meaning in governing China Proper. For example 
the looming disappearance of Manchu language did not worry the Qing ruling elite only 
for its cultural value, but Manchu language had also military significance as a secret 
code of communication.  
 
In accordance with the collective action theory, Manchus were also an institution whose 
members were united by a common goal. Overthrowing the Ming Dynasty and 
establishing and extending the Qing Dynasty had benefits that could be attained by 
becoming a Manchu. These mutual benefits included a better status and increase in 
wealth. The situation was comparable to earlier Jurchen Jin Dynasty where, as Peter Bol 
argues, power and privilege were distributed, most of all, along ethnic lines. Accepting 
other criteria for the allotment for such benefits would have thretened the status of the 
Jurchen elite. 224  As Crossley points out, the Jianzhou Federation was falling apart 
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because of economical problems and Ming raiders.225 In order to unify the Jurchens and 
prevent them from disbanding, Nurhaci had to declare war against the Ming. However, 
after the Qing Dynasty being a Manchu was increasingly less lucrative and therefore 
many disregarded their Manchu affiliation and decided to assume Han Chinese or 
Mongol identities.  
 
The reason why Manchus were such an invisible group in Manchukuo is not merely 
caused by cultural and linguistical acculturation because, as discussed above, Manchu 
ethnic identity was not dependent on uniform cultural and linguistical behaviour. 
Instead, the failure to form and maintain the Manchu institution resulted in Manchus 
being perhaps the most neglected group of people in Manchukuo. The Manchu leaders 
did not have the resources to form a power-based institution despite their anxious will to 
redeem the Qing Dynasty. On the other hand, it was not particularly beneficial to be a 
Manchu, whereupon forming an institution based on collective action was likewise 
improbable. There are many reasons to this. Firstly, both the Japanese in Manchukuo 
and the Chinese in the ROC were against the potential strengthening of the Manchu 
institution; Manchus continued to be symbols of the imperial era, and had succeeded in 
conquering the China Proper before. In a worst-case scenario, they might do it again, 
something both the Chinese and Japanese opposed to their own ends. Therefore the 
weakened and scattered state of Manchus was beneficial for all major actors involved in 
the Manchukuo issue. In Manchukuo, other ethnicities that belonged to the collection of 
“Harmony between the five races” were supported to some degree, but Manchus did not 
enjoy any privileges resulting from their ethnicity. Especially in Heilongjiang, many 
Manchus succeedeed in maintaining some form of their older culture, but the 
Manchukuo government did not invest in supporting Manchu heritage, for example 
arranging education in Manchu language, on any level. The social status of Manchus in 
Manchukuo was not particularly good, but neither did it get worse from the ROC 
period.  
 
Furthermore, the decomposition of the Manchu institution started already during the 
Qing Dynasty; the existence of an institution based on collective action depended on 
constant conquest and expansion of the Qing state, and the spoils of war that followed. 
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However, as the enlargement of the Qing state halted, also the Manchu bannermen 
gradually lost their purpose and became unemployed. Manchus had always been 
hierarchical when it comes to family and clan relations, but during the Qing Dynasty 
inequality and differences in income between Manchus increased to a level beyond what 
they had ever been during the Ming Dynasty. Being a Manchu had merely some royal 
significance and it ensured the subsidies paid by the Qing government. However, these 
subsidies became increasingle meager. When the Qing state fell, subsidies were cut and 
Manchus became objects of fervent persecution. Manchus as an institution, based on 
both collective action and power, was diminished – a situation that did not markedly 
improve until 1950’s when being a Manchu had once again more benefits than 
disadvantages. One should note that the amount of Manchus and their social status has 
never necessarily correlated with the survival rate of so-called indigenous Manchu 
culture and language. Today, only few speak Manchu language, including the faraway 
villages in Northeast China. Regardless of this unfortunate situation, Manchus fare 
better than they have for decades.  
 
All things considered, it seems that forming and maintaining the Manchu institution in a 
successful fashion was dependent on both the power-based and collective action model, 
the relations of which varied through time. Today, Manchus can be considered mainly 
an institution based on collective action, since being a Manchu in PRC ensures some 
social benefits, and is also an expression of recuperating Manchu identity. I emphasize 
that Manchus can be discussed by using a wide array of concepts, such as an “ethnic 
group”, “ethnicity” or “institution”, but one should remember that Manchus are, by no 
means, a very consistent group, and each term indicates different aspects of Manchus.  
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5. Conclusions 
 
“满族是一个进步很快，变化很大的民族，所以， 
满族的风俗习惯随着历史的发展而发生着变化。” 
Miao Zuoqi, 1990226 
 
Manchus and Manchukuo were both complex historical entities, both of which initially 
were artificial constructs commenced in order to pursue certain political and economical 
goals. This, and the sinocentric focus on research, has resulted in ambiguous and 
subjective concepts such as “puppet state” and “sinicization”, which, however, do not 
clarify the multifaceted characters of these phenomena. In this Master’s Thesis I have 
endeavoured to bring forward some criticism that has taken place on these concepts 
since 1980’s, and discuss Manchus in Manchukuo from this new critical point of view 
that aims at questioning earlier hegemonized histories. 
 
The Manchukuo period was an era of both geographical and political dispersion for 
Manchus, the causes of which can be traced to the onset of Qing Dynasty. Since the 
earliest times, Manchus were a heterogenous group united by a common political 
agenda rather than by shared characteristics such as culture and language, which have 
been considered the basis for ethnic group formation especially before 1970’s. During 
the Qing Dynasty, several policies were enforced to create a common Manchu culture 
and history, but these projects failed to have an effect on normal Manchu life; instead, 
Manchus excelled in adjusting to the environments that surrounded their banner 
garrisons all over the Qing Empire. Moreover, during the Qing Dynasty the inequality 
and differences in living standards continuously increased. The Qing-dynasty Manchus 
divided prominently into three groups; the frontier Manchus in Manchuria, the 
bannermen Manchus in garrisons, and the Qing ruling elite in Beijing - mainly the Aisin 
Gioro clan. This division persisted, on some level, also during the ROC and Manchukuo 
periods, although the banner system and stipends paid to bannermen were gradually 
abolished. 
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Furthermore, at the end of the Qing Dynasty Manchus were persecuted and massacred 
in great numbers. Many discarded their Manchuness and took up Chinese names. At 
first, the idea of Manchukuo and the chance to re-establish the Qing Dynasty and 
Manchu dignity through Manchuria fascinated many Qing-loyalists ranging from 
several Aisin Gioros to frontier Manchus. However, they soon discovered that they had 
little influence in the new state that bore their name. Manchuria had been an arena of 
international contest for centuries, which resulted in staggering Han Chinese majority of 
the population especially since the 19th century, and strong Russian and Japanese 
military, industrial and economical presence. The Open Door Policy and incapacity to 
fend off foreign influence further increased Manchuria’s international disposition. Japan 
gradually invaded the area, and with the co-operation of local power-holders and 
members of Qing ruling elite founded the state of Manchukuo in 1932. Manchukuo was 
an multinational and multiethnical state construction project in which Japan invested 
generously, at the same time guaranteeing its own economical privileges. However, 
designating Manchukuo merely as Japan’s puppet state belittles its complexity and the 
role of local power-holders in governing it. These local power-holders, however, were 
mainly Han Chinese landowners who had held the highest political positions in 
Manchuria already before Manchukuo. In order to ensure local co-operation, Japanese 
considered it important to adapt to local political structures on some level, a strategy 
quite different from what they used in Korea and Taiwan. This state of affairs, however, 
left Manchus a rather nominal role in Manchukuo; Puyi as the Chief Executive and 
Emperor of Manchukuo had mainly a representative role, and the role of Manchus was 
highlighted only in propaganda that aimed at legitimating Manchukuo and Japanese 
presence there to Manchurians, Japanese and foreigners alike during the onset of 
Manchukuo’s establishment. At the same time, it can be argued that the small number of 
Manchus in important positions in Manchukuo was not only a result of Japanese 
oppression and propaganda, but also a continuation of the situation before Manchukuo. 
For example Aisin Gioro Xiqia had held formidable military positions in Manchuria 
before becoming a Minister in Manchukuo Government. Compared to other Japanese 
colonies, the political situation in Manchukuo was exceedingly liberal. 
 
Yet Manchukuo was not insignificant to Manchus both in Manchukuo and Manchuria. 
The existence of Manchukuo had mainly negative consequences to Manchus who 
continued to reside in China Proper; they were oftentimes alleged to have sympathy 
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with Manchukuo, which made them enemies of the ROC state 227 . Manchus in 
Manchukuo, however, generally led more stable and prosperous lives. Partly due to 
Japanese presence and development projects, the citizens of Manchukuo enjoyed a 
higher standard of living in means of hygiene, safety, salaries and education. On the 
other hand, the Boxer Rebellion and the fall of the Qing Dynasty still had effects on 
Manchus in Manchukuo; many were impoverished and unemployed or worked humble 
jobs. Moreover, the difference between modern Manchukuo cities and the rural 
countryside was substantial. According to both Japanese and Chinese statistics, the 
number of Manchus in Manchukuo did not increase during the Manchukuo period. One 
can deduct that being a Manchu in Manchukuo was neither especially advantageous nor 
disadvantageous, and neither did any “common Manchu conciousness” flourish on any 
succesful level at the time. Unlike Mongol tradition, Manchu culture and language was 
not promoted by the Manchukuo Government or Japanese officials. Moreover, Japanese 
labelled Manchus and Han Chinese with the common term “Manchurians”, which 
furthermore undermined the separateness and highlighted the closeness of these groups 
– a fact that was indeed quite obvious especially in South Manchukuo. The majority of 
the Manchus who did differ from Han Chinese to a greater level habited rural areas in 
North Manchukuo, and many of them never even saw a Japanese person. 
 
During the earlier half of 20th century, Manchus in Manchuria underwent constant 
changes in regime, which resulted in an identity crisis, a progression meticulously 
researched by Shao Dan in her study Remote Homeland, Recovered Borderland (2011). 
In this thesis I have aimed to continue from were Shao Dan left off, and discuss the 
conceptual problematics that surround Manchus. Manchus are often designated as an 
ethnic group or ethnicity, which, however, undermines the political agenda they were 
originally founded on. Manchus did not share ubiquitous characteristics such as 
language and culture, but were heterogenous and adaptable, and therefore calling them 
an ethnic group is problematic. As Miao Zuoqi wrote in 1990,  “Manchus are an 
ethnicity which has developed quickly and changed greatly over time. In other words, 
the Manchu habits and customs have continuously adjusted to historical developments 
and events that have taken place.” It can be further defined that “Manchuness” has 
differed not only on a linear historical sense, but also horizontally in a geographical 
 
227 e.g. Shao, 2011, p. 158. 
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sense. There simply is no static “Manchu essence” that would have survived through 
centuries. Instead considering Manchus an ethnicity in the sense that they shared a 
common ethnic identity, takes into account their evident diversity – Manchus were 
Manchus because they self-identified themselves in this fashion. However, this point of 
view is otherwise problematic; since the earliest times, the ruling elite has defined 
Manchus from the outside, and on the other hand Manchus themselves changed ethnic 
affiliation quite easily according to their circumstances and needs. Requirements for 
receiving the status of Manchu have changed through history; during the Qing Dynasty 
one could better his social position by becoming a Manchu. Likewise, after the fall of 
the Qing Dynasty, Manchus could increase their chances of survival by becoming Han 
Chinese, Mongols or even Japanese – an adjustment that was quite easy due to cultural 
and linguistical proximity.  
 
The dispersion of Manchus in Manchukuo can be partly explained by the identity crisis 
that Manchus in Manchuria underwent in the earlier half of 20th century, but I argue that 
the failure to form a proper Manchu institution likewise incapacitated Manchus as 
political actors in Manchukuo. Since it was not evidently beneficial to be a Manchu, not 
many decided to redeem their Manchu status even though Manchus in Manchuria were 
not that heavily persecuted after the fall of the Qing Dynasty in the first place, and 
although Manchus in Manchukuo led quite stable lives. Therefore, Manchu institution 
based on collective action was quite weak. Likewise, Manchu leaders were unable to 
unify the miscellaneous Manchus in Manchuria in the same fashion their ancestors did 
in the 16th century. This was possibly not even a viable option for them, since the Han 
Chinese Army of Green Standard and Han Chinese or Hanjun officials had replaced 
Manchus as soldiers and officials already during the Qing Dynasty. Instead, Puyi and 
some other members of the Qing ruling elite seemed to believe that Japan with its 
advantageous technology and modernized ideas could help redeem the Qing Dynasty. 
This, however, was never in the Japanese plans. Instead, both Japanese and the Chinese 
in China Proper were against the potential increase of Manchu nationalism that could 
have endangered their own dominion in China Proper. Manchuria’s infamous (or 
famous) historical role as the starting point for the invasion of China Proper from one 
century to another undoubtedly increased international interest towards its strategical 
position. Therefore, a Manchu power-based institution was similarly not possible in 
Manchukuo.  
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Manchus and Manchukuo are both complicated topics of research, and this Master’s 
Thesis can be but a very generic introduction to this intriguing theme. However, I have 
hoped to point out that the concepts of puppet state, sinicization, ethnic group and 
ethnicity have somewhat diverted earlier research in a fashion that has even resulted in 
ignoring Manchus in Manchukuo altogether. Since this topic still invokes strong 
nationalist feelings in many East Asian scholars, the objective standpoint of a non-East 
Asian researcher is vital. Therefore further research based on archival material and 
interviews is recommended to take place in the near future. 
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List of Abbreviations 
 
CPC = Communist Party of China 
KMT = Kuomintang 
LN = The League of Nations 
ROC = Republic of China 
PRC = People’s Republic of China 
SMRC = South Manchurian Railway Company 
WWII = The Second World War  
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Appendixes 
 
A. The flag of Manchukuo 
 
 
 
The colours on the map symbolize the five ethnicities of Manchukuo: red - Japanese, 
blue - Han Chinese, white - Mongols, black - Koreans and yellow - Manchus.  
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B. The map of Manchukuo, circa 1944. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Young, 1998, p. xiv. 
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C. Population of Manchuria and Northeastern Mongolia: Total Population and Manchu 
Population in Millions. 
 
 
 
Source: Scharping, 1998, p. 25.  
 
D. Population of the Manchus and Han in Manchukuo (1935-1937). 
 
  
 
Source: Shao, 2011, p. 310. Original source: Manshu nenkan (1935-1937). 
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